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INTRODUCTION 
 
A. The Background of the Problem 
 The question of development in a transformational 
society arises in countries of the so – called Third World1 
precisely as the moment in which Third World societies 
encounter the technical, intellectual, and even ideological 
phenomena attendant upon something we shall be pleased 
to call modernity. Specifically, I have concerns about 
modernity in Java, Indonesia. The western colonialism until 
the beginning of the nineteenth century had influenced 
Javanese people to the necessity of modernity. Yet, 
modernity in Java has faced traditional power of the 
Javanese culture and Moslem orthodoxy that force any 
                                                 
1 As usual, countries that are still in a process of transformation 
are associated with the Third World.  Despite the precise historical origins of 
the term “Third World” in the historical fact of non-aligned countries during 
the cold war, the third world countries are associated with the relatively 
poor countries mainly of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Generally, they are 
the countries that are in the process of development to increase economic 
efficiency, expand the nation’s productive capacity and advance technology. 
All those indicate the necessary conditions towards development. Cfr. VICKY 
RANDALL and ROBIN THEOBALD, Political Change and Underdevelopment. A 
Critical Introduction to Third World Politics, Second Edition (New York: 
PALGRAVE, 1998), 32. Also, IAIN MCLEAN, Oxford Concise Dictionary of 
Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 137 and 496. 
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progressive thought of modernity to compromise.2 Javanese 
historical course, in fact, appears as a high tension between 
these two poles, i.e. passive resistant tradition – orthodoxy 
and active social development of modernity. Modernity in 
Java, nevertheless, is the history of the Javanese’s 
understanding of development itself. 
 Generally, my focus of development is on that of 
individual and social structure to actualize the potential of 
human personality. The question of development, therefore, 
is concerned with the relationship of an individual and 
society. At this point, there emerges a social conflict of 
purpose or end to which society develops and attains an 
achievement of every step of social transformation.  
 A given society has been there with a set of 
tradition, way of life, religion, local wisdom or proverb, and 
authoritative persons; in sum its common life. Regarding to 
those social facts, a given society actually finds difficulty in 
achieving the necessary social transformation or in attaining 
a purpose or an end, which society discovers for itself when 
it encounters as well as chooses to embrace modernity. An 
inner conflict of society, then, inevitably ensues. This is 
                                                 
2 For more on this, cfr. DENYS LOMBARD, Nusa Jawa: Silang 
Budaya. Warisan Kerajaan-kerajaan Konsentris. Buku 3, (Jakarta: PT 
Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1996, 2000), 142 – 168.  
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actually the conflict between developmental modernization 
and historical – religious traditions. It is the conflict among 
the ethical power of purpose or of an end, too. Upon that 
ethical power, each of developmental modernization and 
historical – religious traditions leans their vision and 
understanding of reality ideologically towards a certain form 
of social life.  
 Modernity is, in fact, a growth within western 
civilization. Western society continues to experience the 
tension caused by the presence of a (more-or-less) 
developed modernity within the western civilizational 
context, which contains elements inherently resistant to the 
process of modernization.3 The case in Third World 
countries generally and in Indonesia specifically is rather 
different and, in many ways, more complex. The Third 
World countries generally encounter modernity as a highly 
developed complex of the social phenomena, the social and 
cultural sources of which are largely extraneous to the Third 
World societies. The conflict that arises within the Third 
World societies, therefore, is different in kind from the 
cultural conflict attendant upon a growth of modernity 
within the western civilizational milieu.  
                                                 
3 For more on modernity as a growth within western civilization, 
cfr. ERIC VOEGELIN, The New Science of Politics: An Introduction, (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1952, 1987). 
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 The question before us is: how do we resolve the 
conflict between developmental modernization and 
historical – religious traditions when such a conflict arises in 
a society in transformation? I submit that Hegel’s 
conception of civil society as he articulates it in the Elements 
of Philosophy of Right is useful to anyone who would address 
this question.  
Actually, Civil Society is the part of Hegel’s text on the 
Elements of the Philosophy of Right. The text itself is divided into 
three parts, Family, Civil Society, and State. In the part of 
Civil Society, still we have three parts, namely, Abstract 
Right, Morality, and Ethical Life. Ethical Life, thus, is the 
last topic treated in the Elements of Philosophy of Right with 
which the main question of this book is concerned. In this 
part, education, culturation, civilization, cultivation, or even 
transformation of society (translated from German word, 
Bildung) are considered as the important part of the 
discussion on how to be “ethical” in social life.  Hegel 
considers that in order to be a modern society, Bildung is the 
inevitable process of educating people to become civilian. It 
means that no one must be an outcast, outsider, or 
marginalized in a certain society. Everyone is (and must be) 
the civilian, the integral part of community. Bildung is a 
German word wich gives us an image or portrait of such a 
 
social life. In the context of The Elements of Philosophy of Right, 
it is the word with amazing richness of meaning: education, 
culturation, cultivation, portrait, building, civilization, and 
even transformation of social life. The purpose of Bildung is 
that any social life must be rational. 
 
B. The Sources 
 Previously it has been mentioned that Civil Society 
in the Elements of Philosophy of Right is one of three sections of 
Hegel’s discourse on Ethical Life. The two other sections 
are the Family and the State. My principal source of this 
book is Hegel’s work on Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 
translated by H.B. Nisbet, edited by Allen W. Wood, 
published in Cambridge by Cambridge University Press, 
1991. For the second English translation, I consider Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right, translated by Knox, T.M., published in 
London by Oxford University Press, 1952. Thanks to this 
second English translation, I have a kind of opportunity to 
consult any difficulty of getting the original sense in 
comparing one translation to the other because of my lack 
of German language.  
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 Furthermore, I also rely on Charles Taylor’s Hegel 
and Modern Society, published in Cambridge by Cambridge 
University Press, 1979.  
 
C. Theme and Method 
 The title of this book is Building Modern Society in the 
Light of Hegel’s Philosophy. Scrutinizing Hegel’s philosophy on 
building modern society is not easy thing to do. If we expect 
to get some information of his concept on modern society 
and its development, the primary source which must be 
considered is his work on Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 
which takes his special theme on Bildung. This German word 
actually has quite rich and vague meanings, one of which I 
have elaborated a lot as the title of my thesis, namely, 
education. To be noted well, since I started my study on 
modern philosophy at Pontifical Gregorian University in 
Rome, Italy, I had been interested in Hegel’s views on how 
to build modern society by proposing his concept on 
Bildung. In fact, this book is the remake and revision of my 
thesis which is entitled: “Education (Bildung) as the important 
element of Hegel’s Civil Society; an Analysis of paragraph 187 of 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right”. By proposing such a lengthy title, 
I shall proceed through a series of questions, which are: 
 
1. How does Hegel come to propose Bildung as necessary 
to building a Civil Society? At first, this question leads 
me to observe in a general view how Hegel describes 
his notions of Civil Society in the discourse of Ethical 
Life (Sittlichkeit). Then, I expound the necessity of 
Bildung in Civil Society. 
2. What does Hegel mean by Bildung in paragraph 187 of 
Philosophy of Right? Along with exploring the necessity of 
Bildung in paragraph 187, I would like to observe the 
necessity of Bildung in the context of building an 
integral Civil Society as the purpose of society itself. At 
stake in this part of the investigation is whether Hegel 
does, in fact, achieve a synthesis of his social theory and 
his philosophical system.  
3. Bildung in Hegel’s systematic concept is concerned with 
the actualization of human reason as the self-agent to 
take a part of Idea’s self – actualization in an objective 
world. It is about human reason that acquires what is 
surrounding it in social circumstances. Bildung, 
therefore, is about the self-sufficiency of the concept 
itself in the form of human self-formation. Practically, 
the question of the way by which an institutional civil 
society comprehends and applies Bildung to its citizens, 
in fact, contains many social problems. The problem in 
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our epoch is the conflict between the necessity of 
Bildung in the recent form of modernization and the 
social fact of a multicultural society. If Bildung is to 
develop people in the form of modernization, how is it 
possible to practice Bildung among a multicultural 
people? In other words, how is it possible to 
comprehend Bildung in the recent social problem of 
global society whereby people is mixed culturally? 
Because the problem of global society also has born 
that of poverty, how is it possible to comprehend 
Bildung in the face of the problem of poverty? How can 
a certain society in transformation grasp all these social 
problems to step to redefine its purpose or end? 
 
D. The Goal of this Work 
 It is civil society that is responsible for the education 
of citizens, for example, through a formal education or by 
providing a center for skill – training for youth. Civil society, 
in short, should make it possible for citizens to become self-
sufficient persons in civil society. All these things are the 
advances that every citizen has the right to take up, at least, 
the minimum standard of life. All the advance of life in 
 
society is the proof of the social development towards 
modernization.  
 There remains, nevertheless, the conflict or 
incompatibility between the necessity of progressively social 
modernization and the resistance of the local – historical – 
religious traditions.  
 Thus, at the end of this work, I would like to study 
the philosophical – social implication of Hegel’s thoughts of 
the necessity of Bildung in Elements of the Philosophy of Right in 
paragraph 187. In fact, in many developed countries, social 
transformations through education (in the form of civil 
education) are still ongoing. There is, therefore, the need for 
a political and ethical theory to understand them.  
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Chapter One
Civil Society As A Part Of Ethical Life Discourse: A General View 
CHAPTER ONE  
 
CIVIL SOCIETY AS A  
PART OF ETHICAL LIFE DISCOURSE  
A General View 
 
 
Introduction 
 Hegel’s treatment of Civil Society is part of his 
larger discussion of Ethical Life. He treats Civil Society after 
the treatment of The Family and before discussion of The 
State. Hegel treats Ethical Life after the topic of Abstract 
Right and Morality. Ethical Life is the last topic treated in 
Elements of the Philosophy of Right. 
 On the one hand, Civil Society consists of persons, 
who have their own end in the form of a totality of needs.4 
Persons can gain and satisfy their end, however, only by 
entering into relations with other persons. This means that 
the bi-project of Civil Society is the construction of a forma 
of social life that is essentially different when an individual 
was entirely defined in terms of his obligations to others 
within society, which was the subsistent whole, of which, 
                                                 
4 Cfr, G.W.F. HEGEL, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, edited by 
Allen W. Wood, translated by H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), § 182. In the next footnotes of this text, I will note simply in 
this way: P.R., 182. 
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individuals were mere indices. Civil Society is a realm in 
which individuals possess ends, which they achieve through 
the establishment of a new form of relation with one 
another. In Civil Society, each individual is concerned with 
achieving his own end. If we were to stop here, then, Civil 
Society would be a mere index of the sum of individuals 
constituting it. Hegel, however, insists that the end of 
society itself is not annihilated by the individual’s discovery 
of himself as such, i.e. as a being with an end that is not 
reducible to that of society. In other words, even though the 
individual in Civil Society enters into relation with others 
only to achieve his own end, the relation which constitutes 
the form of Civil Society must be ordered to the end of 
society itself, which is not exhausted in the individuals’ end. 
In other words, Hegel posits two principles of Civil Society: 
the individual with his totality of needs and society. The task 
of Civil Society, then, is to make the principles conform to 
one another. This task takes many profound discussions on 
Ethical Life.  
 It is inevitably through rational reflection that the 
two principles of an individual and society may be brought 
into conformity. Civil Society, therefore, becomes the realm 
of rational reflection on the ethical ends, because it is 
through rational reflection that an individual undertakes to 
 
participate in and identify with a form of social life. Civil 
Society, thus, is the realm of reformulation or reflection of 
Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit). 
 The work of this chapter will conclude with a 
reflection on Hegel’s concept of Bildung, which I translate as 
self – education and which constitutes to Hegel the central 
and guiding notion in his consideration of Civil Society. So, 
the work of this chapter will articulate a vision of ethical 
philosophy that is at once a theory of society. In sum, I am 
interested in using Hegel to set in relief the meeting – point 
of ethics and social science in relief.  
 
1.1. Sittlichkeit in the Discourse of Civil Society 
 “Ethical Life is the Idea of freedom as the living good 
which has its knowledge and volition in self-consciousness, 
and its actuality through self-conscious action”.5 Following 
Hegel, Ethical Life is presupposed in the existential fact of 
society. Historically, human beings were driven to behave 
morally by the existential fact of the society in which they 
lived. It is in the factual society in which Ethical Life has a 
kind of ethical power for man. Charles Taylor, who engaged 
                                                 
5 P.R., 142.  
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in studying of Hegel, says the existence of society is the 
facts of the common life. He says, “The basis of my sittlich 
obligation is already there in existence.”6 Accordingly, 
Robert C. Solomon, who also engaged in studying 
Phenomenology of Spirit, speaks of society as what has been 
there, as the social facts of the set of values in society. 
Solomon asserts, “Since a person is defined by his or her 
upbringing and place in society, the individual and individual 
pleasures and interests are themselves determined by the 
society.”7 It is custom by which and in which social 
practices and relation among people in society take place; 
and in custom too there exists a certain categorical norm of 
human behaviour, an ethics.8 
 Sittlichkeit in Civil Society, then, is concerned with 
what has been there, which is experienced by people as the 
way of life in a certain form of social life. We can distinguish 
the appearance of Sittlichkeit in two ways.  
 Firstly, it is the practical side of a set of human 
practical actions in its group or society. Charles Taylor 
describes this aspect of Ethical Life as “the moral 
                                                 
6 CHARLES TAYLOR, Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979, 1998), 83 
7 ROBERT C. SOLOMON, In the Spirit of Hegel (New York, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1983), 537.  
8 For more on this, cfr. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, A Short History of 
Ethics (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 193.  
 
obligations I have to an ongoing community of which I am 
a part.”9 Moreover, “these obligations are based on 
established norms and uses.” These moral obligations might 
be the ethical substance that has a concrete historical 
character that is alive in a certain community or society 
insofar as it establishes the general mode of behaviour.  
 Sittlichkeit, then, is also concerned with a conscious 
experience of customary morality, when customary morality 
refers simultaneously to a system of social institutions and 
to the moral attitude of an individual who identifies with 
them. In other words, Sittlichkeit is an established custom, by 
which and in which someone identifies and lives in his 
certain society.10 Thanks to the identification of individuals 
with a certain society in the form of customs, then, a society 
or any social institution, in fact, arises, functions, or 
perpetuates itself.11 In addition, Hegel says in Philosophy of 
Right, “In habit, the opposition between the natural and the 
subjective will disappears, and the resistance of the subject 
                                                 
9 CHARLES TAYLOR, Op.Cit., 83. 
10 Hegel argues that in the Ethical Life (das Sittliche), our attention 
is attracted to the close connection between individual ethical norms and 
social customs (Sitte). It means that it is custom, by which and in which 
individuals identify themselves with a certain form of social life. Cfr. P.R., 
151. 
11 Cfr. ALLEN W. WOOD, Hegel’s Ethical Thought, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 197. 
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is broken.”12 In other words, individuals are simply defined 
by the social group. They belong to a certain form of social 
life.  
 It is in ancient Greece that the individual’s 
identification with a certain form of social life is achieved in 
the perfect unity of man and Polis. In the Politics, for 
example, Aristotle says, “Man is by nature a political animal. 
He, who is without a Polis, by reason of his own nature and 
not of some accident, is either a poor sort of being or a 
being higher than man.”13 In the world of the Polis, society 
was necessary for man to be fully human, because it was 
only in a Polis that man could live both the good life in any 
full sense,14 and society had the function of serving the end 
of man.15 In Politics, Aristotle emphasizes the unity between 
the necessity of living in society and Ethical Life in the form 
of the way of life or the common norms. Still in Politics, 
Aristotle says, “A city (Polis) is good in virtue of the 
goodness of the citizens.”16 And, he adds, “There are three 
                                                 
12 P.R., 151. 
13 ARISTOTLE, Politics, translated by Ernest Barker, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 1253a2.  
14 Cfr. Idem. 
15 Cfr. ARISTOTLE, Op.Cit.,, 1252a1. 
16 ARISTOTLE, Op.Cit., 1332a28. 
 
means by which individuals become good and virtuous. 
These three are nature, habit, and reason.”17 
 Now, therefore, I would like to underline again the 
existence of society as the real-factual common life in 
discussing Sittlichkeit. But, it is important to note that this 
Sittlichkeit is not a set of principles. It is the consciousness of 
morality as what is customary. In a sense, Sittlichkeit as what 
is customary is what is there in a certain form of social life.  
 It is possible for Sittlichkeit to appear as a set of 
divine laws governing human action. Such a law is accepted 
by a society as unwritten and infallible. According to Hegel, 
“the relationship of self-consciousness to them is equally 
simple and clear. They are, and nothing more. This is what 
constitutes the awareness of its relationship to them.”18 That 
relationship, in fact, is concerned with formulating 
reflections and beliefs about what is absolute and sacred, 
insofar as the individuals must take the absolute and sacred 
object as an absolute base for their life. It is the idea of 
religion in which representational thought works in terms of 
symbols, stories and rites. Religion, in this sense, “gives us a 
                                                 
17 ARISTOTLE, Op.Cit., 1332a38. 
18 G.W.F. HEGEL, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by 
A.V. Miller, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), paragraph 437, page 
261. In the next footnotes, I would simply note it in this way: P.S. 437, 261. 
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self-reflection through various symbols and stories, not 
through conceptually articulated theories.”19  
 Although Sittlichkeit is in a customary and immediate 
form, it is an ethical sphere which has an ethical power 
which actually governs the lives of individuals, because it is 
also believed as a living good. By saying that Sittlichkeit is the 
living good, we mean to say that there is a notion that 
permits the affirmations of common good as social norms 
by grounding those affirmations in the practices of society 
itself. It nonetheless also has constituted people’s rationality 
to live in the guidance of what is ethical as a common norm, 
as a system of social institutions.20 All those moments of 
ethical life constitute what is rational because they are not 
something alien to the subject. Hegel admits that, even in 
what is naturally religious, the substantial element 
considered sacred by individuals is also “endowed with 
consciousness, although the status of the latter is always 
only that of a moment.”21 There are genuine developments 
                                                 
19 TERRY PINKARD, Hegel’s Phenomenology, The Sociality of 
Reason, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 223. 
20 Cfr. P.R., 144-145. 
21 P.R.,, 144 
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of thought that can only proceed in such a representational 
form, and religious thought is one of them.22 
 Now, the living subject requires the freedom to 
ground all those objective ethical principles (in the form of 
Sittlichkeit) on reason. It is a process of internalizing what is 
external in the common norms of ethics, so that they are his 
own.23  
 In regard to that internalization, there is, therefore, 
in Ethical Life something that we might call tentatively a 
twofold movement: toward the objective and at the same 
time toward the subjective. 24  
 Allen W. Wood has discussed this twofold 
movement in the following terms: “Ethical life has both its 
objective side, in the form of a present world or social order, and 
                                                 
22 It is possible because in any religious thought “faith and trust 
arise with the emergence of reflection, and they presuppose representations 
and distinctions.” Further reflection, then, is intended as the insight 
grounded on reasons. Cfr. P.R., 147. 
23 Cfr. P.R., 106 – 107. 
24 When Hegel asserts that living good “has its knowledge and 
volition in self-consciousness”, it points to this subjective order, namely, the 
content of what is good that is known and willed by subject through an 
action in a certain form. Any practical subjective action, for example, means 
actualizing and making what is good in the formal abstract form become 
known, determined, existential, and actually present. A series of human 
actions, therefore, now, becomes a kind of place where an abstract good 
comes into the objective sphere of ethics itself. In this sense, subjectivity is 
the moment of the actuality of Ethical Life.Cfr. P.R., 141. 
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its subjective side, in the self-consciousness of individuals.”25 
Further, “The objective side of ethical life is the substance of 
the individuals who belong to the ethical order26 whereas the 
subjective side, the self-consciousness of individuals, is at 
the same time their consciousness of this substance”.27 In 
relation to the subject, moreover, the ethical substance 
could also appear as the supreme “more firmly based than the 
being of nature”28 in as much as laws and powers guiding or 
governing a certain formal human action in its society or 
group.  
 In that twofold movement of the process of 
internalization, therefore, there are, as it were, two parts in a 
subject who is reflecting an ethical substance. The reflecting 
subject is, now, in opposition between what is good as 
something internal in itself, and what is both as an ethical 
substance and as an existent world or something external. 
Nevertheless, it is not alien to him since it is the part of his 
consciousness.29 Subjectivity of the will must reflect on and 
mediate all the immediate and given ethical substance.  
                                                 
25 ALLEN W. WOOD, Op.Cit., 196. The italic is mine. For the 
reference of the objective side of Ethical Life, cfr. P.R., 144 – 145; and of the 
subjective side, P.R., 146 – 147.  
26 Cfr. P.R., 144. 
27 ALLEN W. WOOD, Op.Cit. 
28 P.R., 146. 
29 Cfr. P.R., 33 and 147. 
 
 Our question, now, is: When will a reflective and 
rational consideration begin? Further, once it begins, when 
does it come into opposition with a ground of the Ethical 
Life (Sittlichkeit) which has claimed itself as the universal, 
governing people in their practice in its space and time in 
circumstances? It happens when norms, beliefs, customs, 
etc., have been put in question by the individuals, or by the 
power of thought. Consequently, there is a moment in 
which man’s identification with his form of social life 
breaks. In other words, in a larger sphere, men might cease 
to identify with the community’s life.  
 This is the critical moment, in which individuals in a 
certain society or group are compelled by their reason to 
redefine what is central for them. Thought has an inherent 
tendency not to be confined by any particular habit, 
practice, or symbol.30 Because the power of thought is 
dynamic, self-transcendent, and fundamentally dialectical, 
questions on ethical substance (for example, in the form of 
a given order) are unavoidable and every action will 
eventually lose its ethical basis. The harmony in ancient 
Greek Polis between an individual’s end and that of society 
                                                 
30 Instead of Kant’s argument that human reason attempts to 
extend cognition beyond the bounds of possible experience that 
consequently makes unwarranted claims to knowledge, Hegel retains that 
our thinking has an inherent tendency to go beyond every limit. Cfr. ALLEN 
W. WOOD 1990, Op.Cit., 2. 
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eventually broke and questions of redefining the end (telos) 
itself arose.31 
 Now, if we take into account Sittlichkeit as a set 
practice, for instance in the form of custom or habit, this 
breaking-up-moment of ancient Greek harmony needs 
something beyond Sittlichkeit. Hegel, in Philosophy of Right, 
takes Plato’s Republic as an example of the failure of 
describing an ideal society, which invokes the need of 
redefining the end (telos) between individuals and society.  
 Now, I would like to take a moment to observe how 
Hegel criticizes Plato’s Republic. Hegel says Republic lacks the 
important thing that Hegel puts forward for the ideal 
society. We know that Plato directs his notion of ethics 
towards the attainment of man’s highest good, in possession 
of which true happiness consists. A subject achieves 
happiness through the pursuit of virtue. For Plato, virtue is 
identical with knowledge. And knowledge for Plato has the 
Good as the unique notion that is distinguished from all 
others. Since Plato says, “The realm of the visible should be 
                                                 
31 Hegel puts forward the societies of the world in the past, which 
were based on the patriarchal and religious principle, or another simple 
principle of ethics. Those societies of the ancient world, according to Hegel, 
were based merely on the natural intuition, so that, when the demands of 
redefining men’s end in the form of rationality had come, those societies 
lost its very principle basis to serve the end of man to happiness. Cfr. P.R., 
185. 
 
compared to prison dwelling”32, in order to get the truth of 
any object of knowledge, everything that is particularly good 
must in a particular way be understood to be so in reference 
to the Form of the Good. More than this, knowledge 
consists in understanding the relation of a particular good to 
the Form of the Good, i.e. in the ability to say how and why 
a particular good is good; how it reflects to the Good. It is 
the Form of Good as a single and unitary notion like a light 
which enlightens our sight to see any object of the good of 
being. Moreover, Plato says, “In the visible world, the Form 
of Good is both light and the fount of light.”33 So, knowing, 
apprehending, and pursuing what comes from and is 
relevant with that Form of Good is virtue and this results in 
wisdom.  
 Plato’s description of society is apt to his notion of 
the unique Form of Good. Plato wants to spread out an 
ideal State in such a way that that society is a perfect model 
for who wishes to look upon it and, then, sets up the perfect 
society.34 
                                                 
32 PLATO, Republic, 517b, in: Classics of Moral and Political Theory, 
edited by Michael L. Morgan, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
1992), 161. In the following footnotes, I would simply note it in this way: 
Republic, 517b, 161. 
33 PLATO, Op.Cit., 517b, 161. 
34 Plato says, “I understand, he said, you mean in the city which we 
were founding and described, our city of words, for I do not believe it exists 
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 In Plato’s ideal State, there are three great classes. 
There is the artisan class with its associated virtue of 
temperance. There are the Auxiliaries or military class with 
courage and fortitude over the artisans. Finally, there is the 
class of Guardians, which are at the top of wisdom, that is, 
possessing true knowledge for the good of man (it means 
also that it is the class of philosophers).  
 Hegel criticizes Plato’s appointment of individuals 
to their particular classes, his assigning them to certain social 
roles according to their particular class. For example, in 
Plato’s Republic, on behalf of the common interest, namely, 
of the city itself, the class of Guardians and Auxiliaries may 
not hold private property, nor may they marry. They will 
live merely under the care of the State because their life is 
totally dedicated to the State. Contrarily, private property 
and family in Hegel’s concept of Civil Society are the 
arbitrary will of individuals and their choice of a social 
position.35 
 Plato’s notion of building a stable and steady society 
in Republic is completely in opposition to Hegel’s 
                                                                                               
anywhere on earth. Perhaps, I said, it is a model laid up in heaven, for him 
who wishes to look upon, and as he looks, set up the government of his soul. 
It makes no difference whether it exists anywhere or will exist.” See, PLATO, 
Op.Cit., 592b. 
35 P.R., 185. 
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understanding of Civil Society. In Hegel’s view, Republic 
eliminates the two principles of Civil Society itself. 
According to Hegel, Plato’s Republic presents “the substance 
of ethical life in its ideal beauty and truth, but it cannot come 
to terms with the principle of self-sufficiency particularity.”36 
For the annulment of a subjective freedom and strict 
reduction of individuals under control by the State in Plato’s 
Republic shows the separated or split existence of 
particularity (citizens) and universality (State). If it is so, 
there is no transformation into one another. If there is no 
particularity in opposition to universality, universality would 
have no way of realizing itself.  
 In addition, if citizens lacked the principle of self-
sufficiency, they could not define their identity. Their 
existence in society would not be recognized and known 
legally. They would not be free. The lack of self-sufficiency 
in Plato’s Republic results in what Hegel calls ethical 
corruption. It is the ultimate reason for the downfall of the 
states of the ancient world, because the principles of Civil 
Society are regarded with the self-sufficiency of particularity 
and honour among its individual members, which comes 
from that self-sufficiency.37  
                                                 
36 P.R., 185. 
37 Cfr. P.R., 245. 
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 This understanding of the necessity of individual 
self-sufficiency in Civil Society leads us to see the necessity 
of something beyond Sittlichkeit as we have discussed it up 
to this point. The other side of the breaking-up-moment is 
the redefinition of the relation between the individual and 
his society. From this point, every individual is called to 
become a rational moral agent. A rational moral agent is a 
subject who is capable of reflecting critically on his social 
and historical situation.  
 Thus, it is Morality that comes to the realm of 
Ethical Life, and both are interwoven or interpenetrated in 
the form of personal as well as social life. We know that 
Hegel makes a distinction between Morality (Moralitat) and 
Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit).38 Hegel says, “Ethical life is the Idea 
of freedom as the living good which has its knowledge and 
volition in self-consciousness, and its actuality through self-
conscious action”.39 Hegel’s treatment of Ethical Life, then, 
leads to a discussion of freedom. The kind of freedom 
Hegel is at pains to discuss, however, is not in status quo. The 
Idea of freedom Ethical Life is one of passing from 
consciousness of customary morality to reflective morality.  
                                                 
38 Cfr. P.R., 33. 
39 See, P.R., 142. 
 
 Freedom, further, is a part of the development of 
the Idea of the will to become free in and for itself. What 
kind of freedom is this?  
 In saying that freedom is a part of the development 
of the Idea of the will, I mean that Hegel conceives Morality 
as the will is developing to become the subjective will. 
Each individual has an ethical end, which guides and 
informs him to affirm and do what is good. But it is still 
what is good that is affirmed by any social conditions 
surrounding him. In other words, the good is still 
immediately given. It is also the will to pursue the Ethical 
Life without any further reflection that must be done by 
subject. What is affirmed as good is still merely prescribed 
and dictated, for instance, by God, or by the social system in 
the form of traditions and customs40; it is known by an 
individual immediately. If an individual affirms what is 
good, for instance, his affirmation still belongs to the 
immediate will. If he or she did or did not do it, his social 
conditions would judge him/her as doing what was good or 
bad, right or wrong. There is not yet the freedom of will, 
since it is still grounded by immediacy, irrationality, and 
                                                 
40 To do what is dictated and prescribed to be virtuous, in a sense, 
is easy. In an ethical community that follows an order as what is merely 
given, dictated, and prescribed, for instance, there is not yet a distinction 
between what someone must do and what the duties are. Cfr. P.R., 150. 
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as the will is developing to become the subjective will. 
Each individual has an ethical end, which guides and 
informs him to affirm and do what is good. But it is still 
what is good that is affirmed by any social conditions 
surrounding him. In other words, the good is still 
immediately given. It is also the will to pursue the Ethical 
Life without any further reflection that must be done by 
subject. What is affirmed as good is still merely prescribed 
and dictated, for instance, by God, or by the social system in 
the form of traditions and customs40; it is known by an 
individual immediately. If an individual affirms what is 
good, for instance, his affirmation still belongs to the 
immediate will. If he or she did or did not do it, his social 
conditions would judge him/her as doing what was good or 
bad, right or wrong. There is not yet the freedom of will, 
since it is still grounded by immediacy, irrationality, and 
                                                 
40 To do what is dictated and prescribed to be virtuous, in a sense, 
is easy. In an ethical community that follows an order as what is merely 
given, dictated, and prescribed, for instance, there is not yet a distinction 
between what someone must do and what the duties are. Cfr. P.R., 150. 
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naturalness. The freedom of will must be grounded on 
subjectivity.41  
 Further, even though those practises of Ethical Life 
have the powers of governing individual behaviour in as 
much as they are, they are still in the objective form. As the 
objective form, those absolute and sacred things in a natural 
religion are not yet known. So, even though in a religious 
sphere they are considered as the absolute, the eternal, the 
sacred values, they are still outside the realm of subjective 
self-reflection.  
 Because human reason is free, a rational subject sees 
that there is a gap between what he thinks he is doing and 
what he is really doing. It is rational consciousness which 
guides a subject to be free to obey only the dictate of his 
own will because human reason by its universal freedom 
must rebel against everything merely given. 42 The question 
of freedom, now, is concerned with the critical moment in 
which the power of reason penetrates Sittlichkeit. Thanks to 
this process of rational reflection, the abstract concept of a 
given order, for example, becomes understood, known, and 
determined. Sittlichkeit, now, is actualized in the form of the 
new set of the rational social order in the same society by 
                                                 
41 Cfr. P.R., 106 – 107.  
42 Cfr. P.R., 105 – 107, 150. CHARLES TAYLOR, Op.Cit., 76 – 77.  
 
the cultivated individual, who is the subjective agent of 
morality. Thus, society becomes characterized by a new 
rational standard through the subjective agent. 
 According to Charles Taylor, Hegel’s achievement 
lies in uniting the Kantian radical notion of autonomy and 
the expressive unity of living in society referring to Greek 
Polis .43 In insisting that moral life reaches its highest 
realization in Sittlichkeit and it requires society, Hegel follows 
Aristotle’s conception of living in Polis to reach happiness as 
the human end.  Meanwhile, Kant’s giving preference to 
rational-radical autonomy has inspired Hegel to the freedom 
of subjectivity of the will. Hegel decides, however, not to 
choose Aristotle’s way of merely living in Polis without 
individual freedom, nor Kant’s purely formal morality 
without being accessible to any relationship of social life. 
Hegel, instead, takes up both, and tries to synthesis them. 
 
1.2. Civil Society: A General View 
 The concept that underlies that critical passage is 
that of the internal subdividing Spirit, of the scientific 
                                                 
43 Cfr. CHARLES TAYLOR, Hegel, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), 374 and 388. Cfr. Also CHARLES TAYLOR, Hegel and Modern 
Society, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, 1998), 82 and 84. 
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Society, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, 1998), 82 and 84. 
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development of Idea, being out of itself in its breaking-up-
moment in its internal opposition.44 Regarding the family, 
that concept underlies the notion of Civil Society as actually 
the process of conforming Sittlichkeit (for example, an 
ethical order that individuals have been educated in family) 
with its redefinition through positing itself. The process is 
that of rational reflection. That is the process of becoming 
existent and real what is still conceptual and abstract in the 
former level. Only through this moment, that is, the 
moment of internal breaking-up in the form of internal 
opposition can “abstract thinking attain actuality and ethical 
objectivity.”45 It is, thus, the process of growing up 
internally.  
 
1.2.1. The Passage of Ethical Life: From Family to 
Civil Society 
 Actually, when individuals of family come into Civil 
Society, it occurs that “the immediate unity of the family has 
disintegrated into plurality”.46 Coming into society, every 
person of a family is drawn out from the family to become a 
self-sufficient person, because it is self-sufficiency that is 
                                                 
44 Cfr. P.R., 32 – 33.  
45 P.R., 207. 
46 P.R., 184. 
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44 Cfr. P.R., 32 – 33.  
45 P.R., 207. 
46 P.R., 184. 
 
required by the reality of Civil Society for every citizen. An 
individual in Civil Society faces more complex social 
relations and orders than the child in the family. This 
passage from family to Civil Society is also the moment for 
an individual to place all of his behaviours in a more rational 
– social way than every ethical tie that binds every member 
of a family, which is natural, immediate, and given. Instead 
of an individual’s existence in a family, in which there could 
be no clear distinctions of what one ought to do and what 
one is, in society there must be a number of social orders 
that are more or less systematically and legally defined, and 
which drive all its members’ behaviour. Hence, Hegel called 
the self-sufficient person of Civil Society torn away from his 
family as a son of Civil Society.47  
 This passage from Ethical Life, therefore, concerns 
also the passage from natural simplicity or the immediate to 
the reflected and mediated, or from the natural ethical or 
merely given order to the rational one. In the case of the 
individual’s passage from his family to Civil Society, it is 
concerned with the process of institutionalizing norms into 
Civil Society. 
 Now, in coming into Civil Society, an individual 
faces the problem that was not in the family, namely, that 
                                                 
47 Cfr. P.R., 238. 
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what is and what ought to be.48 In coming into Civil 
Society, there emerges “the distance between private and 
public that is to be mediated, if we understand the former as 
the vanishing point where the social integration of the 
family is dissolved before the mediations characteristic of 
Civil Society begin”.49 Further, an individual entering into 
Civil Society must also face the social fact of the public 
authority that has the right to legislate, codify, and engage in 
public administration to manage all the persons and 
properties in Civil Society. In the passage of Ethical Life 
from Family to Civil Society, thus, Sittlichkeit is on the level 
in which the oppositions of ought and is, right and duty, 
subject and object, even what is rational and what is actual, 
appear in the very public realm. 50 
 Concretely, in Hegel’s Civil Society, all antinomies 
and tensions in every moment of civilizing society or 
institutionalizing norms exist in the public sphere. It 
requires a great deal of effort to unite all the oppositions in 
the public realm, to redefine people’s identification with a 
certain form of social life at a higher level. Hegel’s 
                                                 
48 Hegel says, “In the ethical realm (of family), a human being has 
rights in so far as he has duties, and duties in so far as he has rights.” See, 
P.R., 155. 
49 JEAN L. COHEN and ANDREW ARATO, Civil Society and Political 
Theory (Cambridge, London: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992, 
1999), 96. 
50 Cfr. JEAN L. COHEN and ANDREW ARATO, Op.Cit., 95. 
 
description of Civil Society spreads out those oppositions to 
become equilibrated between man and his needs, and 
between human consciousness and nature.51 In Hegel’s 
terms, Civil Society is that in which “the Idea has lost itself 
in particularity and split up into the division between inward 
and outward.”52 It is now up to us to see how dynamic Civil 
Society is in its worldly interpretation of Idea in the real 
life of its citizens. 
 
1.2.2. The categories of Civil Society 
1.2.2.1. The System of Needs and Work 
 The system of needs is the first instance of Civil 
Society because, according to Hegel, regarding to its first 
principle, Civil Society is constituted by a particular person 
with a totality of needs, and it is through work he attains the 
satisfaction of these needs.53 The subject of Civil Society is 
concretely he who has subjective needs from the complex 
of natural necessity and arbitrary will. A man, however, is 
not like the other creatures in the way he satisfies his needs. 
                                                 
51 Cfr. P.R., 194. Also cfr. SHLOMO AVINERI, Hegel’s Theory of The 
Modern State, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972),145 
 
52 P.R., 229. Also cfr. P.R., 33.  
53 Cfr. P.R., 182, 189. 
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51 Cfr. P.R., 194. Also cfr. SHLOMO AVINERI, Hegel’s Theory of The 
Modern State, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972),145 
 
52 P.R., 229. Also cfr. P.R., 33.  
53 Cfr. P.R., 182, 189. 
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As a rational being, a man may judge among means to his 
needs. This is, moreover, a rational process or abstraction of 
needs by a process of multiplying needs and means. The 
multiplication of needs and means, then, is a consequence 
of dividing and differentiating more particular needs into 
individual parts and aspects. This is a characteristic of 
modern Civil Society.54 
 Satisfying needs and choosing means (by which 
those needs will be satisfied optimally) are two relational 
aspects that emerge in Civil Society. They are the relation 
with subject himself internally and with others externally.55 
 In relation to himself, satisfying needs through the 
mediation of work by a subject is actually a process of 
objectifying needs. Since the human subject is rational, man 
gives a rational value to both, based on his needs and his 
mediating work to satisfy them. In creating any product as 
the result of certain works, for example, there is always a 
                                                 
54 In paragraph 201 of Philosophy of Right, Hegel asserts what he 
means of the more complex development of civil society. “… The whole 
complex evolves into particular systems of needs, with their corresponding 
means, varieties of work, modes of satisfaction, and theoretical and practical 
education.” And, further, from this increasing of the varieties of needs, 
Hegel divided society in class system based on their particular capacities of 
their possibility of skill and education contribution to the society, shown in 
the following articles: substantial or immediate estate, the reflecting or 
formal estate, and the universal estate. P.R.,, 201. 
55 It is in fact regarding with the two principles on which civil 
society is based on. Cfr. P.R., 182. 
 
rational subjective value. Work, then, creates “the feeling of 
right, integrity, and honour which comes from supporting 
oneself by one’s own activity and work”.56  
 In the result of work, then, there is a kind of 
representation of a subjective rational process on 
appropriate values. Since, after any period of work, the 
result of satisfied needs is property, property has the value 
of subjective possession. Or, in other words, in possessing a 
certain property as a result of subjective work, there is the 
identification of subject with objective property.57 This bears 
an inter-connected correlation between needs, work, and 
property as the result of subjective work. Whoever 
consumes a human product, consumes human rational 
effort in the form of work.58 Regarding the subjective work 
and the identification of subject with the result of that work 
(in the form of properties) through a process of rational 
valuing, the subject in possession of property makes that 
property become, in a sense, the part of the subject itself. 
The subject in possession of a property as the result of his 
work, then, is distinctive and unique.  
                                                 
56 See P.R., 244. In Hegelian civil society context, these values of 
human work are very important, without which, in the unfortunate 
conditions of poverty, the poor are burdened by external distress, because 
they are unskilled, uneducated, and then incapable to share to the universal 
resources of civil society.    
57 For example, my house, my car, my computer, etc. 
58 Cfr. P.R.,196. 
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 The inter-connected correlation between needs, 
work, and property as the result of subjective work, what we 
have observed above, is in fact about the actualization of 
human reason itself in the subjective sphere. In the concrete 
objective sphere, since a society requires the completion of 
the moral life of every individual in living among the others, 
every particular subjective work to satisfy needs must be 
commensurable with all others in society. It is therefore 
concerned with the subjective will in a private sphere in its 
correlation with the general will of the public sphere. In 
Philosophy of Right, Hegel says,  
“The selfish end in its actualization, 
conditioned in this way by universality, 
establishes a system of all-round 
interdependence, so that the subsistence and 
welfare of the individual and his rightful 
existence are interwoven with, and grounded 
on, the subsistence, welfare, and rights of all, 
and have actuality and security only in this 
context.”59 
 So, we are now in another aspect of satisfying 
individual needs, namely, in relation with others in society. 
This interconnection evokes any invention of means to 
satisfy people’s needs in society as the endless rational 
process in Civil Society. The invented means also emerges 
                                                 
59 P.R., 183. 
 
in the form of multiplication of needs and work in the 
linked form of social life.  
 Needs, work, and property must, therefore, have a 
social character. They bear an inter-dependency to secure 
and to keep society in equilibrium between its two 
principles. According to Hegel, every member of Civil 
Society is capable of sharing a “contribution towards the 
satisfaction of the needs of everyone else”.60 Civil Society 
becomes, then, that which grows on the basis of economic 
and developmental policy. Such a society, therefore, must 
have the capability of economic self – regulation or 
management. In short, it must be capable of political 
economy, especially in the form of a self – regulating 
market.61 
 Subsequently, there emerge two excesses of that 
mode of economic social integration: the universal and 
permanent resources on the one hand, and people’s skills as 
individual’s possibility of sharing in the universal resources 
on the other hand. Individual skill is also correlated with 
education. Moreover, there is also the reality of the 
inequalities of people’s skill and education because all would 
attain their livelihood and welfare as the proper end “whose 
                                                 
60 P.R.,, 199. 
61 Cfr. JEAN L. COHEN and ANDREW ARATO, Op.Cit., 98. 
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60 P.R.,, 199. 
61 Cfr. JEAN L. COHEN and ANDREW ARATO, Op.Cit., 98. 
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actualization is conditioned by the individual’s own arbitrary 
will and particular nature”.62 
 In this economical system, there would also be the 
problem of how to conform and balance the individual 
participation in the form of sharing economic resources 
through education and skills, on the one hand, and the 
society’s need for the universal and permanent resources of 
society on the other. The demand for conformity and 
equilibrium is necessary in the light of the real – social fact 
that not all citizens have the same possibility of sharing 
universal and permanent resources. There are, after all, 
inequalities of skill and limits of individuals’ abilities to 
benefit from education. 
 From this point, Hegel develops a system for Civil 
Society, which is based on the system of law that will 
guarantee and secure that economic system legally (admitted 
by any valid law). In other words, there should be a legal 
system in which such a system could guarantee and secure 
the two principles of Civil Society that we have seen 
previously. 
 
                                                 
62 P.R.,, 230. 
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62 P.R.,, 230. 
 
1.2.2.2. The Administration of Justice: The System of 
Law 
 Hegel proposes many detail points on The 
Administration of Justice in his Philosophy of Right, but, here I 
would simply emphasize some points concerned with the 
process of making the interdependency of the two 
principles of Civil Society legal and valid. It is precisely Civil 
Society with its system of positive laws in the codified, 
legislative, and administrative form that is the rational 
product of the modern human action.  
 Hegel asserts, “When what is right in itself is posited in 
its objective existence, it becomes law, and through this 
determination, right becomes positive in general.”63 In 
Hegel’s vocabulary, being posited means objectifying, 
determining by thought in such a way that what is posited 
can be affirmed and known explicitly.64 Positing abstract 
rights means, therefore, bringing out subjective and private 
individual rights, and then raising them up to the level of 
being recognized by others actually and legally. This is the 
institutionalization of abstract right. Law, in fact, is that in 
which the subjective, particular, and private right becomes 
                                                 
63 P.R., 221. 
64 Cfr.  MICHAEL INWOOD, A Hegel Dictionary, (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1992), 224-226. 
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objective, universal, and known by another in the social 
sphere. It is the passage from the private sphere to the 
public one.  
 A means by which subjective-private rights become 
positive law is codification. Every process of codification 
actually should begin through a reflection of an internal 
subjective right, because in being codified, an abstract and 
subjective right finds its determination in being known and 
recognised by others. This is a rational process. It is actually 
the process of positive law. “Only when it (right) becomes 
law does what is right take on both the form of its 
universality and its true determinacy.”65 Positive law, thus, is 
the determinative form of abstract and subjective right. By 
its positive dimension, right is actualized, measured, and 
communicable, in its social inter-subjective relation.  
 In other words, the positive law is a systematization 
of right under the specific form of codification. Codified 
right, then, can be known, and only as such can it have any 
validity in a certain society. Because every person in Civil 
Society should be legal, thus, every property and personality 
has legal recognition and validity in Civil Society by the 
process of codification of abstract rights.66 In a sense, Hegel 
                                                 
65 P.R., 211. 
66 P.R., 218. 
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66 P.R., 218. 
 
characterizes the positive law as a confining term between 
the private and public sphere, or an individual and society.67 
Consequently, there could be actually a great confusion of 
private and public sphere in the optimal point of positive 
law. But, it is really the essence of Civil Society itself 
regarding its difference from the family, in which, the 
familiar relation loses and all the relations constitute “the 
world of appearance of the ethical”.68 
 The rational passage in modern society that posits 
subjective right and the entire private world in positive law, 
in fact, is that which there was not in the antique society, or, 
what Hegel calls societies which “were based on original 
natural intuition”.69 Positive law, therefore, is supposed to 
be an achievement and rational-reflective product of the 
modern human action in society. In other words, being 
different from the antique societies whose standards to 
attain the equilibrated relationship between the ends of 
people and that of society were merely given, immediate, 
and un-reflected, positive law as the rational-reflective 
product of the human subject in modern society is the 
achievement of modernity itself. This achievement is also 
                                                 
67 Cfr. P.R., 211 – 213. Also cfr. JEAN L. COHEN and ANDREW 
ARATO, Op.Cit., 95. 
68 P.R., 181. 
69 P.R., 185. 
42
Building Modern Society In The Light Of Hegel’s Philosophy
 
marked by the fact that abstract and individual right, in 
being posited and known, attains its true determinacy in 
which “all the contingencies of feeling and opinions and the 
forms of revenge, compassions, and selfishness fall away.”70 
Thus, in modern society, an individual’s existence and 
participation in Civil Society is guaranteed and secured by 
positive law.71 
 I have shown previously that the administration of 
justice in the form of positive law as the system that aims at 
guaranteeing and securing the two principles of Civil Society 
in its wholly interdependency’s form. Also, in Civil Society, 
needs, work as the means to satisfy needs, and property as 
the result of work, are linked. The positive law function of 
legislating and validating, therefore, should encompass its 
function of guaranteeing and securing them all, including 
the people’s possibility of accessing education and skills 
towards their sharing in the universal resources.72 
 I think, regarding the function of positive legislation 
to guarantee and secure the linked needs, work, and 
property of Civil Society, all the external and social 
relationships which are lawful, must appear and be revealed 
                                                 
70 P.R., in addition to paragraph 211. 
71 Cfr. P.R., 217. 
72 Cfr. P.R., 200, 237 – 239.  
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as the object of legislation to be known and recognized by 
the valid law. In other words, only in the validly posited law 
can right be known and recognized legally.73 But he asserts 
immediately the necessity of clarifying the positivist problem 
concerning with morality and the moral precepts for not 
being able to be matters for a positive legislation. “Only 
those aspects which are by nature capable of having an 
external dimension can become the object of legislation.”74  
 Our problem now is: who will be responsible for the 
just and right application of valid law in order to guarantee 
the legislation, which properly interconnects the two 
principles of Civil Society? How do such valid laws have a 
binding force on every person towards equilibrating the two 
principles of Civil Society? Those questions, actually, lead us 
to discuss the administration of justice by public authority. 
 
1.2.2.3. General Authority 
 It is the system of justice that maintains the 
equilibrium of that economic chain and the interconnection 
of every economic element of Civil Society. And, further, it 
is the public – general authority that keeps the maintenance 
                                                 
73 Cfr. P.R., 212 – 213. 
74 Addition to P.R. 213. 
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of that system of justice to be done and run well by every 
member of Civil Society. It has also an oversight control 
and advance provision of the universal functions and 
arrangements of public utilities.75 A professional judge, for 
example, is the organ of the law and, then, he must be 
capable of knowing any case that disturbs the universal 
system of Civil Society76, as well as of categorizing it in the 
codification of law. This means he must be capable of 
linking the particular cases and empirical proofs with the 
legal and political institutions as the rational character of 
Civil Society.77 
 The general – public authority also guarantees that 
the subject of Civil Society is, without exception, a client of 
general authority and an association member. It is about the 
safeguarding and oversight procedure on behalf of security 
– not only on persons and property of every member of 
                                                 
75 Cfr. P.R., 226. In this paragraph, Hegel refers the task of 
professional judge to “the supervision of the whole course of the inquiry, 
and the legal actions between parties”. Further, a judge must also supervise 
the application of law including its dispensation to particular cases. So, also 
cfr., P.R., 225.  
76 In saying of cases that disturb the universal system of civil 
society, I refer to what Hegel says of crime and punishment. According to 
Hegel, crime is considered as an injury of one member of civil society that, in 
its turn, is also an injury to all others. Because everyone in civil society has 
his right to express his private life in taking part in social sphere, in being 
criminal, therefore, someone has injured this expression of taking part in 
social life. This invokes a legalization of punishment as the reconciliation of 
criminals with his right and that of his certain society. Cfr. P.R., 218, 220. 
77 Cfr. P.R., 219, 226 – 227. 
 
Civil Society, but also their guaranteed livelihood and 
welfare.78 Regarding the economic chain in the form of 
interconnection, for example, public authorities must 
maintain that interconnection in which the business of one 
is at the same time carrying out that on behalf of all others 
in the linked market economy. In this sense, public authority 
functions as providing the universal aspect of Civil Society 
for calling upon all particular aspects of any dimensions of 
people’s lives.   
 Public authority, thus, is aimed at safeguarding Civil 
Society based on a system and it should be ready to re-
establish itself if there was any collision opposing it.  
 
1.3. Education (Bildung) as the important Category 
of Hegel’s Concept on Civil Society 
 Here, I would like to repeat what I have observed 
on what Hegel emphasizes on Civil Society in Philosophy of 
Right. They are the two principles of Civil Society in 
paragraph 182 of Philosophy of Right. All of what Hegel wants 
to describe Civil Society is in this contradiction and at the 
same time conformity between a particular person who has 
                                                 
78 Cfr. P.R., 221. 
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78 Cfr. P.R., 221. 
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his own end as a totality of needs and a mixture of natural 
necessity and arbitrariness, and the fact that at the same 
time he can accomplish his own ends only through the 
others in Civil Society, or in Hegel’s terms, through the 
mediation of the form of universality. This contradiction 
between the individual ends and that of society is at the 
same time a motor by which Civil Society moves and grows 
up.79 
 To understand this kind of contradiction between 
the individual end and that of society, natural intuitions as 
the principle of some antique societies are not adequate 
principles for underlying the self-movement of society 
itself.80 Hegel, therefore, takes Civil Society’s need for self-
sufficiency both of particularity and of universality that must 
be bound up and conditioned by each other in the linked 
economic interconnection.81  
                                                 
79 Cfr. CHARLES TAYLOR, Op.Cit., 46. 
80 Cfr. P.R., 185. 
81 The inner ethical corruption could happen in society based on 
merely natural intuition and, worse than never, it makes individuals in it be 
only mass, or crowd without identity and right guaranteed by positive law, 
or society be mere collective individuals. So, the individual attains actuality 
only by entering into existence and having to be conscious of himself as 
engaged in activities whose objective worth is recognized by others. In other 
word, subject actuality is gained by being linked with the universality of 
continuum. The continuum word will be expounded in the second chapter. 
Cfr. ALLEN W. WOOD, Op.Cit., 241. Cfr. Also P.R., 184 and 207. 
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 Further, to understand this kind of contradiction 
that is at the same time a motor of the self-movement of 
Civil Society, we need to understand the movement of 
rationality itself. The portrait of modern Civil Society must 
be that of a cultural society which is based on the process of 
human reason. It should not be based on a merely natural 
ethical principle which underlies society to satisfy the 
individual end and that of society through merely a common 
life or a given social order, but, rather, it is a modern society 
as the more and more rational one, in which there must be a 
reflective historical process of Ethical Life itself.  
 Now, all categories or characters of such a society 
are born from society itself. Social facts are the immediate 
prescriptions of the given or the simple and natural Ethical 
Life.82 Instead, society is described in itself and by itself. 
Hence, Civil Society is the very real and objective moment 
of Ethical Life itself, in and by which the Idea is constituted 
to become its reality. It is properly the Hegelian vision of 
society. Society, thus, is a product of a human rational 
culture in its progressive process towards its maturity. 
                                                 
82 Shortly, Hegel thinks of the society based on original natural 
intuition which could be considered as the prescribed society by such 
natural intuition. This natural word will be the important word used as the 
opponent of education or Bildung, which will be expounded in the following 
chapter. Cfr. P.R., 185.  
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Again, it is culturally and not naturally or immediately 
society.  
 That Bildung is the important element of Hegel’s 
concept of Civil Society, may now come into view. It is 
Bildung to attain the understanding of the two principles of 
Civil Society in paragraph 182 of Philosophy of Right as the 
contradiction as well as the motor of self-movement of Civil 
Society. More than other categories by which Hegel 
characterizes his concept of modern society, I prefer to 
expound Bildung in paragraph 187 of Philosophy of Right 
because there is a special kind of bond between Hegel’s 
theory of society and his philosophy of ethics, and, 
consequently, from the same place there could emerge 
many problems.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THROUGH EDUCATION (BILDUNG) TOWARDS 
SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY  
 
Introduction 
 In the first chapter, I expounded Hegel’s description 
of Civil Society which is based on two principles. On the 
one hand, Civil Society is constituted by the existence of the 
individual as a concrete person as a totality of ends. On the 
other, every individual in Civil Society must stand with the 
others in the form of a social relationship. These two 
principles can become the potential of social conflict, 
because as they stand, they are (at least possibly) 
contradictory. On the other hand they can be a motor of the 
self – movement of society.  
 I called Bildung the concept in which the conflict 
between the two principles might be reconciled without 
destroying the conflict itself, which is a motor of Civil 
Society. I take paragraph 187 of Elements of the Philosophy of 
Right as the fundamental text of my analysis.  
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2.1. Bildung as the Living Moment of Civil Society’s 
Maturation 
2.1.1. Hegel’s Concept of Bildung in Paragraph 187 of 
Philosophy of Right 
 In his work on Philosophy of Right, Hegel writes,  
“Education is the absolute transition from an ethical 
substantiality which is immediate and natural to the 
one which is intellectual and so both infinitely 
subjective and lofty enough to have attained 
universality of form.”83 
By the quotation above, we comprehend Bildung as 
something which deals with the absolute transition or 
absolute passage (der absolute Durchgangspunkt). This absolute 
transition is of an ethical substantiality, from one which is 
immediate and natural to the other one which is intellectual, 
subjective, and spiritual.  
 To understand this absolute transition, I would 
begin with the various meanings of Bildung as self – 
education, self – shape, or self – cultivation of an individual 
in the realm of ethical life. It is also about the individual’s 
                                                 
83 See, G.W.F. HEGEL, Philosophy of Right, paragraph 187, 
translated with notes by T.M. Knox, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 
125. It is my second English translation text of Philosophy of Right besides 
the principal translation, i.e. G.W.F. HEGEL, Elements of the Philosophy of 
Right, edited by Allen W. Wood, translated by H.B. Nisbet, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
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transition from a certain stage of ethical life, for example, 
from family’s education to a higher stage in which someone 
becomes free a self – conscious individual. Saying Bildung is 
the absolute transition of an ethical substantiality, therefore, 
means of a certain process. Precisely, it is concerned with 
the process of individual maturity of reason in which there 
is man’s effort to gain his self – consciousness “through his 
interaction with the objective world surrounding him.”84 
Shortly, Bildung is that which is happening in an individual as 
a kind of a process toward maturity.  
 Our starting point is the fact that man is the focus 
of Bildung as self – education, self – shape, as well as self – 
cultivation. Man is locus in order that Bildung comes about. It 
is man as an individual, who has been there and undergoes 
it. Let us begin, therefore, with what we have noted well as 
the two principles of Civil Society.  
 The first principle of Civil Society leads us to look at 
the fact that individuals who exist in Civil Society are 
“private persons who have their own interest as their end."85 
They are not persons without a certain form of social life. 
The existence of persons in Civil Society is marked by that 
                                                 
84 See, SHLOMO AVINERI, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 132. 
85 P.R., 187. 
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of belonging to a certain family. It is precisely that family 
which ties all its members ethically in the form of love and 
feeling.86 Accordingly, it is in the family that someone grows 
up to find himself within other persons. The existence of 
the family in Civil Society, therefore, is indispensable since 
the existence of a person is marked only by his necessary 
existence in a unified family.87 Consequently, family is the 
first necessary condition of Bildung.  
 After speaking of the locus of Bildung, now, I would 
like to go on to the form or the condition of the existence 
of Bildung in the ethical life. In the section on the Family in 
the Philosophy of Right, Bildung is the parental mode of 
bringing up children to guide and form them to gain certain 
characters and capabilities in order that, becoming free 
personalities, they will be ready to enter into Civil Society 
when they become of age.88 Specifically, by training them to 
form good characters, parents teach their children what is 
ethically good in a family. In a family, children have to learn 
                                                 
86 Cfr. P.R., 158 and the addition to paragraph 33. 
87 Hegel emphasizes that the individual’s existence in family is not 
due to contract. An individual, rather, has its family membership ethically in 
“love, trust, and the sharing of the whole of individual existence.” See, P.R., 
163. Further, that marriage is not based on contract but instead it consists of 
the immediate ethical relationship marked by natural vitality and family ties, 
means that the existence of every individual in family has been there in a 
very substantial sense. Hegel, therefore, insists that family must be a union. 
In a unified family, the membership of family makes everyone in it feel at 
home and essentially exists. Cfr. P.R., 75, and SHLOMO AVINERI, Op.Cit., 139. 
88 Cfr. P.R., 177. 
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how to behave well, that parents accustom them to doing 
what is good. In short, it is education in pedagogical or/and 
tutorial way in a family for children to be good.89 One of the 
results of family Bildung as the form of educating children is 
that every person in a family will inherit many good 
characters and capabilities as well as talents.  
 In the subsequent process of Bildung in a family, 
children must exercise themselves by reasoning or reflecting 
on their daily relationships. It presupposes that children as 
human rational beings come into their moment of 
reasoning. It is their capacity of reason which puts in front 
of reason itself all the natural ethical simplicity and every 
given talent. All the ethical substances now come into their 
subjective understanding, in which the subject (for example, 
a child) knows ethics.  
 It is actually the family’s moment of taking their 
participation to educating human beings as rational ones.90 
Bildung, therefore, becomes the way through which a family 
takes its important and indispensable role in Civil Society. 
The family becomes the basic life of every human social 
being in which every individual exercises how to educate 
                                                 
89 Further, Hegel says, “Education (pedagogik) is the art of making 
human beings ethical.” Cfr. P.R., 151. 
90 Cfr. SHLOMO AVINERI, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 132.  
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and cultivate himself.91 In short, since a family has an ethical 
power over children, the individual’s existence in a unified 
family is indispensable for Bildung.92  
 In regard to the process of the individual’s coming 
into Civil Society, Bildung as the family mode of bringing up 
children ethically is an educating way toward civilization, 
because in Civil Society, all persons need “to be recognized 
as legal persons and as capable both of holding free 
property of their own and of founding their own families.”93 
 In speaking of Bildung in the discourse of Ethical 
Life, therefore, the family has the power to bring up 
children. It is in fact the ethical power of the family to take 
care and educate children. The family, in other words, 
determines much of the basis of the ethical life, 
notwithstanding its immediate and natural form. It is 
properly the strength of the family that Hegel poses as his 
conception of Ethical Life before speaking of Civil Society.  
 In the previous chapter, I have noted that an 
individual takes part in a larger life to attain his full moral 
                                                 
91 Hegel emphasizes that family’s education to the children must 
be based on the fact that “human beings do not arrive by instinct at what 
they are destined to become; on the contrary, they must attain this by their 
own efforts.” See, P.R. 151 and 174 with its addition.  
92 For more on this, cfr. SHLOMO AVINERI, Op. Cit., 139; also cfr. 
P.R., 75 and in addition to paragraph 173. 
93 P.R., 177. 
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life. It is society, then, in which Ethical Life has been there. 
“What we are as human beings we are only in a cultural 
community”, so that, “a language, and the related set of 
distinctions underlying our experience and interpretation, is 
something that can only grow in and be sustained by a 
community.”94 Civil society appears as a whole complex 
(Zusammenhang) which “evolves into particular systems of 
needs, with their corresponding means, varieties of work, 
mode of satisfaction, and theoretical and practical 
education”.95 
 Living in a certain society is not easy. It requires 
effort. Living in a certain form of social life requires both 
practical and theoretical knowledge. It requires 
understanding how to be and live in society as individuals 
taking part in a larger life. Furthermore, this means that 
Civil Society is charged by the education of individuals to be 
citizens. It is education for civilization. Civil Society 
provides an organic system of customs and institutions. It is 
responsible for preventing people from falling into being 
                                                 
94 In this sense, I would like to cite Charles Taylor’s observation in 
emphasizing of the necessity of community in order that the life of language 
and culture is larger than that of the individual. And so, it happens only in 
community. See, CHARLES TAYLOR, Hegel and Modern Society, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979, 1998), 87. 
95 P.R., 201 
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un-educated. To be out of society means the nothingness of 
personality.96  
 We have come into the course of Bildung from the 
realm of the family to that of Civil Society. The necessity of 
Bildung in the family is also a family’s preparing children to 
come into the moment of the ethical dissolution of the 
family when an individual takes his participation in the 
larger life of Civil Society.  
 When Hegel says, “Civil society tears the individual 
away from family ties, alienates the members of the family 
from one another, and recognizes them as self-sufficient 
persons,” and thus, “The individual becomes a son of civil 
society,”97 he means that every individual in living Civil 
Society must undergo civil society’s Bildung, because Civil 
Society has its Bildung as a way by which everyone must 
learn how to do it. Civil Society now appears and requires a 
system in which there is an interdependency connecting all 
                                                 
96 We have known that, in accordance to Greek Polis tradition, it is 
impossible for the individual to live fully human life outside society. We will 
see in the following discussion that civil society must educate its people by 
insisting that parents send their children to school “in so far as this has a 
bearing on their capacity to become members of society”.  We have 
observed, then, that being or taking the member of society as the fulfillment 
of human reaching moral life is the main point of view of educating civilians. 
Cfr, P.R., 239. 
97 P.R., 238. 
 
its contents into an established system of all-round 
interdependence. 98  
 Civil Society’s interdependency requires an 
individual’s self-sufficiency. Thus, Bildung is necessary for 
every individual who would be a full member of Civil 
Society. It is, now, in the form of exercising individual 
capabilities to overcome individual limitations and 
naturalness to open his possibility of sharing to the social-
universal resources.  
 Hegel distinguishes the theoretical Bildung from the 
practical one.99 Theoretical Bildung is about the capability of 
thinking all given, natural, as well as immediate things, doing 
estimates, comparing, and classifying objects. It is actually 
the process of understanding and reasoning by which all 
objects become subjective and understood by a cultivating 
subject. Bildung in this sense is the disposition of the mind 
toward growing out of an inner process of formation and 
cultivation. Theoretical Bildung is the availability of a subject 
                                                 
98 The necessity of interdependency in an established system is 
evoked by the relationship among people to exist and satisfy their needs in 
society. Actually, we are still around the question of the two principles of 
civil society that Hegel describes it. Cfr, P.R., 182 and 183. 
99 Cfr. P.R., 197. 
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come into the moment of the ethical dissolution of the 
family when an individual takes his participation in the 
larger life of Civil Society.  
 When Hegel says, “Civil society tears the individual 
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from one another, and recognizes them as self-sufficient 
persons,” and thus, “The individual becomes a son of civil 
society,”97 he means that every individual in living Civil 
Society must undergo civil society’s Bildung, because Civil 
Society has its Bildung as a way by which everyone must 
learn how to do it. Civil Society now appears and requires a 
system in which there is an interdependency connecting all 
                                                 
96 We have known that, in accordance to Greek Polis tradition, it is 
impossible for the individual to live fully human life outside society. We will 
see in the following discussion that civil society must educate its people by 
insisting that parents send their children to school “in so far as this has a 
bearing on their capacity to become members of society”.  We have 
observed, then, that being or taking the member of society as the fulfillment 
of human reaching moral life is the main point of view of educating civilians. 
Cfr, P.R., 239. 
97 P.R., 238. 
 
its contents into an established system of all-round 
interdependence. 98  
 Civil Society’s interdependency requires an 
individual’s self-sufficiency. Thus, Bildung is necessary for 
every individual who would be a full member of Civil 
Society. It is, now, in the form of exercising individual 
capabilities to overcome individual limitations and 
naturalness to open his possibility of sharing to the social-
universal resources.  
 Hegel distinguishes the theoretical Bildung from the 
practical one.99 Theoretical Bildung is about the capability of 
thinking all given, natural, as well as immediate things, doing 
estimates, comparing, and classifying objects. It is actually 
the process of understanding and reasoning by which all 
objects become subjective and understood by a cultivating 
subject. Bildung in this sense is the disposition of the mind 
toward growing out of an inner process of formation and 
cultivation. Theoretical Bildung is the availability of a subject 
                                                 
98 The necessity of interdependency in an established system is 
evoked by the relationship among people to exist and satisfy their needs in 
society. Actually, we are still around the question of the two principles of 
civil society that Hegel describes it. Cfr, P.R., 182 and 183. 
99 Cfr. P.R., 197. 
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to go beyond his immediate experience100 from the state of 
nature into that of rationality. It is human understanding in 
conceptual form.101 It is properly about understanding the 
truth. “Truth in philosophy means that the concept 
corresponds to reality.”102 In truth, there is agreement 
between the subject who understands and the object 
understood by the subject. Theoretical Bildung, thus, is about 
the activity of human reason. It is the process of thinking 
and developing concepts through human reason as the locus 
of concepts. Through the activity of theoretical Bildung, 
human reason acquires what is received in a certain way in 
which nothing disappears, but everything is preserved.103 
Man, who is working to understand an object, is making 
that object a part of him.  
 Working on theoretical Bildung, then, means that 
nature does not stay at its mere existence. Rather, by the 
human rational capability it is raised up to the level of 
concept. It includes, for example, how to reflect rationally 
on every representational thought in the form of traditions, 
religions, symbols, religious rites, customs, social ethical life, 
                                                 
100 Cfr. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, Truth and Method, second 
edition, translated by Joel Weinsheimer and  Donald G. Marshall, (London: 
Sheed & Ward, 1975), pg. 14. 
101 Cfr. P.R., 187.  
102 P.R., in addition to paragraph 21. 
103 Cfr. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, Op.Cit., 12. 
 
etc.104 In working on theoretical Bildung, according to Hegel, 
there can occur “a more advanced stage of Bildung 
(culture)”. 105 Theoretical Bildung, thus, is meant as the 
moment of a human rational being’s development in the 
more advanced reason of understanding natural objects. 
Whoever lacks this Bildung will also lack the rational power 
of abstraction.  
 When Hegel emphasizes Bildung as working to 
eliminate natural simplicity “whether as selflessness or as 
barbarism of knowledge and volition”106, he would 
encompass not only theoretical Bildung but also the practical. 
Both are necessary in Civil Society.  
 Concretely, working on practical Bildung makes a 
subject exercise and get his applicable skill through an 
objective activity. Only by this practical Bildung is an 
individual able to link himself with his society. Through 
working in objective activity and developing the applicable 
skills, i.e. through practical Bildung, a subject links himself, 
between his totality of needs and his society as the necessary 
                                                 
104 It must be noted well immediately that those representational 
thoughts in those forms display rationality too, and, thus, they constitute 
also the developing Idea in society, since, according to Hegel, “nature is 
rational within itself that it is this actual reason present within it which 
knowledge must investigate and grasp conceptually.” We will see this in the 
following sentences. See, P.R., in Preface page 12. Confer also P.R., 145-146. 
105 P.R., 32. 
106 P.R., 187. 
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means by which he can accomplish his needs.107 In this 
Bildung, through which an individual joins his private life 
with his social-historical context as the larger life, it is still 
always necessary to remember that society in Hegel’s view is 
the only place in which man can fulfill morality. Properly in 
this sense Hegel says,  
“In this situation, the interest of the Idea, which is 
not present in the consciousness of these members 
of civil society as such, is the process whereby their 
individuality and naturalness are raised, both by 
natural necessity and by their arbitrary needs, to 
formal freedom and formal universality of knowledge and 
volition, and subjectivity is educated in its 
particularity.”108 
 At this point, Hegel’s understanding of Bildung as 
subjective participation of the actuality of Idea comes into 
view. Hegel considers that man’s activity of thinking to 
understand object is his participation in the scientific 
development of Idea. Understanding an object means 
making an object correspond to subject’s ratiocination so 
that such an object is raised up to the level of a universal 
concept.  
 Note that we are not concerned here with the 
broader question of Hegel’s ontological vision of universe 
                                                 
107 Cfr. P.R., 182 and 187. 
108 P.R., 187. 
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107 Cfr. P.R., 182 and 187. 
108 P.R., 187. 
 
arriving at the expression of Spirit in a manifested world and 
human history. We are merely at pains to understand and 
trace some of the implications of Bildung as subject’s effort 
to participate in the larger life of Civil Society in terms of 
Civil Society’s two principles.109 
 In the realm of Civil Society, Bildung is a means of 
reconciling individual and social ends. As a means, then, 
Bildung names the subjective hard working toward a rational 
agency and participation in the larger social life. In this 
subjective hard working of the human rational agent, there 
could be what I have previously called the absolute 
transition as the result of Bildung.  Such a transition, 
however, would still be part of the human historical process 
Bildung has its conditions of existence.  
 We are now, therefore, in the course of Bildung as a 
means of the human historical process from antiquity to 
modernity through human rational capability. George 
Armstrong Kelly, who particularly studies Hegel’s Bildung, 
says, “Antiquity (even Sittlichkeit) is not anti-intellectual for 
Hegel, but rather the ripe germ of all intellectual 
cultivation.”110 In Bildung, the historical passage from 
                                                 
109 I have discussed this in chapter I. 
110 See, GEORGE ARMSTRONG KELLY, Idealism, Politics, and 
History, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 344. 
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antiquity to modernity goes through man’s education, 
maturation, fulfillment, joy, suffering, etc. Following Kelly’s 
statement above, nature is the expression of rational Spirit, 
and then, it is rational within itself. That is the starting point 
of viewing Bildung as a means of building the unified 
relationship between individuals and Civil Society in the 
form of the human historical process. The present civil 
society must always be linked with that of the past and the 
anticipation of that of the future.  
 Hegel admits that natural things display rationality, 
albeit in a completely fragmented manner.111 Each ethical 
substance of every individual in the past actually had the 
power to drive the individual’s conduct, because although it 
was natural and fragmented, it constituted its self-
consciousness. We have seen this previously as Sittlichkeit, 
the Ethical Life, by which man identifies himself with the 
actual living principle of self-consciousness. Human beings 
are actually driven by natural forces, too.  
 Only through the process of reflective reasoning in 
the form of Bildung is everything particular and different in 
Sittlichkeit raised up to the higher form. The problematic 
breakdown of unified society in Greek Polis, that is, the 
discontinuation of individual’s identification with his 
                                                 
111 Cfr. P.R., 146. 
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111 Cfr. P.R., 146. 
 
society, is the starting point of human rational effort in 
Bildung. Bildung, therefore, is a human task: to rise to a higher 
form of understanding. It certainly requires sacrificing all 
particularities and everything known immediately and 
naturally. Note that this does not mean the elimination of all 
those we have known from our parents’ or traditions’ 
educations. It means that all I have known now becomes my 
own, for I now understand subjectively. Again, in what is 
acquired by Bildung nothing disappears: everything is 
preserved.112 
 Let us turn back to our starting point, that is, the 
two principles of Civil Society following Hegel’s description 
in paragraph 182 of Philosophy of Right. How can Bildung 
conduce the interdependency between the ends of an 
individual and that of Civil Society? In other words, how 
can we understand the conception of an individual’s ability 
to educate himself and at the same time sacrifice his 
individuality to make himself a link “in the chain of this 
                                                 
112 Cfr. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, Op.Cit., pg. 12. George Armstrong 
Kelly also makes a comment on what Hegel attempts to eliminate and 
preserve at the same time everything in the past as the higher form for the 
necessary value of the present. He says that, through the conception of 
Bildung, “Hegel makes every conscious effort to adapt what is relevant of 
the classical ideal in his notions of curriculum and education for modern 
citizenship.” Cfr. GEORGE ARMSTRONG KELLY, Op.Cit., 344. 
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continuum (Zusammenhang)”113, that is, the social life as a 
larger life?  
 
2.1.2. Bildung as the Moment of Struggle within a 
Subject 
 We have already seen how Bildung has various 
meanings: self-education, self-shape, and self-cultivation. I 
have discussed Bildung as the human rational activity to take 
the rationality of the things surrounding him in order to gain 
the self-authority of knowledge. Hegel says “Education 
(Bildung) irons out particularity to make it act in accordance 
with the nature of the thing (Sache)”.114 Moreover, he says,  
“Education, in its determination, is therefore liberation 
and work towards higher liberation; […] Within the 
subject, this liberation is the hard work of opposing 
mere subjectivity of conduct, of opposing the 
                                                 
113 The continuum word is the English translation of the German 
word, Zusammenhang. At paragraph 201 of Philosophy of Right, Hegel uses 
again this word to refer to “the whole complex that evolves into particular 
systems of needs, with their corresponding means, varieties of work, modes 
of satisfaction, and theoretical and practical education”. It is a kind of the 
entirely linked connections among the general masses. In its term, it could 
be also referred to social ties between particularity and universality, for 
instances, between individuals and society, in which the universal resources 
(namely, society) depends on every particular characteristic of the individual 
concerned, on the sharing of every family that initially provides the 
individuals in it by giving them the means and skills and then they could be 
the good member of their society. P.R., 238. 
114 P.R., in addition to paragraph 187. 
 
immediacy of desire as well as the subjective vanity 
and the arbitrariness of caprice.”115 
 Concretely, Bildung brings the subject to sacrifice his 
individuality and immediacy. Hegel, indeed, admits that 
sacrificing individualities and immediacy is not an easy thing 
for any person to do. Now, in the following discourse, I 
would expound what that subject effort to achieve liberation 
and higher stage means in Bildung. Precisely, I would explain 
how human reason must work hard to understand his social 
life as the larger one, which is the expression of reason. 
Further, it is also about how reason itself is capable of 
guiding human conduct in society.  
 I would stop for a moment to see how Hegel’s 
understanding of reason that guides human rational action is 
different from Kant’s. The necessity of reason in Kantian 
obligation comes purely from the will of the human rational 
being. According to Kant, it is reason as an end in itself that 
is a criterion of all human actions, by which and in which all 
rational beings are equal in dignity. Because of the rational 
being, an individual is the rational agent of self-governing 
his moral behavior. By its rational moral principles, in other 
words, every rational being is an end in itself.116 It is 
                                                 
115 P.R., 187. 
116 In his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant says, 
“The will is thought as a capacity to determine itself to acting in conformity 
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115 P.R., 187. 
116 In his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant says, 
“The will is thought as a capacity to determine itself to acting in conformity 
66
Building Modern Society In The Light Of Hegel’s Philosophy 
properly rational autonomy as the ground of morality and 
makes every rational individual by nature the end in itself.  
 Moreover, there are categorical imperatives as 
universal law, by which moral duties are supposed to be 
unconditionally valid. The Formula of universal law is as 
follows; namely, “Act only in accordance with that maxim 
through which you can at the same time will that it become 
a universal law.”117 Every individual in Kant’s conception of 
morality, thus, is subjective as well as universal through and 
in their action; namely, the action that is motivated by 
rational will. Again, that is in the realm of the end in itself. 
Conclusively, in Kant, the necessity of reason in guiding 
human moral actions is demanded as the basis of objective 
grounds or reasons by which a rational agent constrains to 
                                                                                               
with the representation of certain laws. And such a capacity can be found 
only in rational beings. Now, what serves the will as the objective ground of 
its self-determination is an end, and this, if it is given by reason alone, must 
hold equally for all rational beings.” See, IMMANUEL KANT, Groundwork of 
the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:428, translated by Mary Gregor, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 36. 
117 See, Ibidem, 4:421. In the same text, Kant notes the meaning of 
a maxim as “The subjective principle of acting, and must be distinguished 
from the objective principle, namely the practical law. The former contains 
the practical rule determined by reason conformably with the conditions of 
the subject. It is therefore the principle in accordance with which the subject 
acts. But the law is the objective principle valid for every rational being, and 
the principle in accordance with which he ought to act, i.e., an imperative.” 
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act.118 This, then, makes Kantian ethics accused of being 
mere formalistic or empty formalism. 
 In Hegel’s critic to Kant, Kantian radical rational 
autonomy as the ground of morality means a duty which is 
to be willed merely as a duty and not because of its content. 
Saying the pure and unconditional self-determination of the 
will as the root of duty as the result of a subject’s rational 
will, then, according to Hegel, makes Kantian’s moral 
conception deprived of content that comes from 
agreements or contradictions of every principle by which an 
individual acts. Hegel, then, criticizes Kant’s moral 
obligation on duty as “a formal identity which necessarily 
excludes every content and determination.”119 Kantian 
moral philosophy, based on categorical imperatives (as if 
they were the blue-prints for guiding subjective moral 
actions), is still dogmatic self-determination. Since the 
criterion of duty in Kant is to be purely formal, then, “moral 
                                                 
118 Cfr. ALLEN W. WOOD, Kant, (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 
2005), 136. 
119 The content of moral obligations, for instance, in the form of 
duty, must come from contradictions among principles, namely, in social 
relations among human rational agents. Further, complete human life is that 
from which duty is determined and becomes concrete as well as not merely 
formal. According to Hegel, therefore, property and human life should exist 
and be respected in morality. P.R., 135. 
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autonomy has been purchased at the price of vacuity.”120 In 
the context of the political theory, then, Kantian morality is 
not familiar with social relationships. For Hegel, meanwhile, 
duties must come from social life as the realm of objective 
field.121 
 Hegel tries to radicalize the Kantian self-autonomy 
of moral action on the basis of practical reason. He attempts 
to do so, however, without appealing to categorical 
imperatives. Self-determination should be understood as 
“pure-being-on-our-own that belongs to free thought.”122 
Only in such is there “nothing under it or above it, and 
where we stand in solitude with ourselves alone.”123 Hegel, 
in fact, is inspired by the harmony and immediacy of the 
Greek Polis, as well as the radical autonomy of Kant.  
 So, our question now is how to reconcile them. 
How can an individual pursue the self-determination of his 
ends as a concrete person and at the same time identify 
                                                 
120 CHARLES TAYLOR, Op.Cit, 77. Cfr. also, ROBBERT B. PIPPIN, 
Modernism as A Philosophical Problem, second edition, (Massachusetts: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 65. 
121 According to Hegel, society is rational because it is the objective 
field, in which “the right of insight applies to insight into legality or 
illegality.” It is also because “action is an alteration which must exist in an 
actual world and thus seeks recognition in it.” Cfr. P.R., 132. 
122 See ROBERT B. PIPPIN, Op.Cit., 65.  
123 Ibidem. Both of this footnote and of the footnote number 38, 
Robert B. Pippin is quoting from what Hegel said in Hegel’s Logic: Part One 
of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, translated by W. Wallace, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). 
 
himself with the ethical ends of the society in which he 
lives? 
 Within a subject, now, Bildung becomes a struggle 
because he must express his life in conformity with the 
expression of reason itself, and then, the true expression of 
rationality is found in social life.124 In that struggle itself, 
there must be the long process of the subjective cultivation 
to become an educated man.125 It is in fact the educated man 
who has already undergone this long process of Bildung and 
then come to understand his private life in the social life. 
The process of Bildung, however, does not cease here 
because Bildung itself has no goals.126 Bildung itself is only a 
                                                 
124 Hegel notes very well in Philosophy of Right the point that 
“legal and political institutions are rational in principle and therefore 
absolutely necessary, and the question of the form in which they arose or 
were introduced is entirely irrelevant to a consideration of their rational 
basis.” In another part of Philosophy of Right, Hegel emphasizes, “Only 
through this mediation with the universal does he [the individual] 
simultaneously provide for himself and gain recognition in his own eyes and 
in the eyes of others.” It is concerned too with Hegel’s vision that in 
individual’s realizing his rational being, society has its indispensable part, 
because the world (of which society is the part) is the necessary expression 
of rationality itself. Cfr. P.R., 207, 219, in its translated edition by T.M. Knox. 
Cfr. also CHARLES TAYLOR, Op.Cit., 47 – 51.  
125 Hegel admits this long process of Bildung within a struggling 
subject when he says, “The process of development *Bildung] begins with a 
content whose form is sensuous and immediate and, by means of long and 
arduous work, arrives the form of thought appropriate to this content and 
thereby gives it simple and adequate expression.” Cfr. P.R., 217. 
126 In Truth and Method, Hans-Georg Gadamer comments, “Like 
nature, Bildung has no goals outside itself.” He adds, then, that “In having no 
goals outside itself, the concept of Bildung transcends that of the mere 
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autonomy has been purchased at the price of vacuity.”120 In 
the context of the political theory, then, Kantian morality is 
not familiar with social relationships. For Hegel, meanwhile, 
duties must come from social life as the realm of objective 
field.121 
 Hegel tries to radicalize the Kantian self-autonomy 
of moral action on the basis of practical reason. He attempts 
to do so, however, without appealing to categorical 
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“pure-being-on-our-own that belongs to free thought.”122 
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where we stand in solitude with ourselves alone.”123 Hegel, 
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120 CHARLES TAYLOR, Op.Cit, 77. Cfr. also, ROBBERT B. PIPPIN, 
Modernism as A Philosophical Problem, second edition, (Massachusetts: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 65. 
121 According to Hegel, society is rational because it is the objective 
field, in which “the right of insight applies to insight into legality or 
illegality.” It is also because “action is an alteration which must exist in an 
actual world and thus seeks recognition in it.” Cfr. P.R., 132. 
122 See ROBERT B. PIPPIN, Op.Cit., 65.  
123 Ibidem. Both of this footnote and of the footnote number 38, 
Robert B. Pippin is quoting from what Hegel said in Hegel’s Logic: Part One 
of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, translated by W. Wallace, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). 
 
himself with the ethical ends of the society in which he 
lives? 
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then come to understand his private life in the social life. 
The process of Bildung, however, does not cease here 
because Bildung itself has no goals.126 Bildung itself is only a 
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means by which an individual understands his world and has 
knowledge of the world itself. Through Bildung, an 
individual knows how to contribute his existence to his 
society.127  
 It is through Bildung that an individual comes to 
understand the connection between his ends and those of 
society, since Bildung itself includes striving toward thought 
and system in the inner-ness of an individual, in picking up 
what is essential in every matter around a subject, and then 
drawing that which is essential to the common level of 
understanding conceptually.128 Bildung, therefore, has its role 
for every person to fully exist in Civil Society.129 
 Only by courage in struggling to go beyond all his 
limitations and individuality can an individual get beyond his 
immediacy and naturalness and really participate in society. 
It is by courage to face the individual and particular 
limitations that an individual goes beyond himself towards 
what is the universal form of understanding everything 
                                                                                               
cultivation of given talents, from which concept it is derived.” Cfr. HANS-
GEORG GADAMER, Op.Cit., 11. 
127 Cfr. P.R., 187, 197. 
128 Cfr. GEORGE ARMSTRONG KELLY, Op.Cit., 345. 
129 In saying of Bildung as that through which an individual takes 
his participation in social life and subsequently becomes one of every 
moment of civil society, Hegel says, “Each individual, by a process of self-
determination, makes himself a member of one of the moments of civil 
society through his activity, diligence, and skill, and supports himself in this 
capacity.” Cfr. P.R., 207. 
 
surrounding that subject itself, namely, his living society. 
When this is happening, someone is growing up. 
 
2.1.3. Bildung as the Moment of Growing Up 
 Although Bildung as the individual mediation to 
conform his particularity to universality requires a hard 
struggle and accounts for any disfavour to an individual 
itself, as I have preceded it, Bildung as an education is the 
progressive transition of every individual. In other words, 
there is progression toward maturity as a result of doing 
Bildung.  
 Remaining in immediacy and naturalness means 
staying at a particular stage, in the merely given order which 
drives individual in particular conditions, in 
unconsciousness whereby there is no fullness of rationality. 
Man as a rational being naturally tends to go beyond the 
limits of his particularity toward the fulfilment of his end in 
the form of underlying the entire plan of rationality. Hegel 
admits that this process is by means of a long and arduous 
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work until achieving the higher stage of development in 
arriving at the form of thought.130  
 But, this is properly the process of development, in 
which every individual grows up in the form of self-
consciousness. Individual’s growing up as a result of Bildung 
is the development of society itself because, thanks to the 
breaking up of individuals’ self-identification with society, 
there bears a rational effort of redefining the conformity 
between individual ends and those of society. This 
developing passage is very important for both individual and 
society mediated by Bildung, because, concretely, the more 
educated people are, the more likely social change toward 
the equilibrium of the two principles of civil society will be.  
 In speaking of Bildung as something by which and in 
which an individual grows up, and as one which affects 
social change, I would follow the interpretation of Charles 
Taylor, in Hegel and Modern Society. Social change, in Taylor’s 
example, is based on the change of a people’s idea or 
orientation of life. Or, in other words, it is a people’s idea 
that can shift the allegiance of people to society, let us say, 
after the break down of individual’s identification with his 
society.131 The educated man, as one who has achieved the 
                                                 
130 Cfr. P.R., 217. 
131 CHARLES TAYLOR, Op.Cit., 127.  
 
result of Bildung, knows and becomes alert very well through 
understanding the Idea which is taking place in the mind of 
the people in his society. The educated man grows up 
through his hard-work of self-education (Bildung) to respond 
to what is there in people’s minds (Idea) of his society.  
 Bildung as social reflective reason in its rational 
activity, therefore, moves people’s rational consciousness in 
raising all the particularities of civil society in the form of, 
for example, myths, traditions, folklore, religious culture, 
etc., up to the point of the new constitution in the light of 
reflective reason. It means interpreting all those 
particularities in the long history of what was there in 
people’s minds.  
 Social change is just one of the results of subject’s 
activity in Bildung. Importantly, through the work of Bildung 
in history, a subject is staying in the rational moment of 
memorizing, presenting, and valuing all the particularities of 
society to make all of them objective in his own 
understanding. Through Bildung, therefore, a subject grows 
up in understanding what was, is, and will be in a certain 
society. In other words, by Bildung, a subject becomes aware 
of his history. Think of Gadamer’s interpretation in Truth 
and Method of how Bildung makes someone exercise his 
intentional memory of history and makes him grow up to be 
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capable of  giving himself to existence in his world.132 
Bildung is, thus, the element in which we move and exist in 
both our private and social life.  
 
2.2. Building Citizens as Educated People towards a 
Steady Civil Society 
2.2.1. The Educated Man in Civil Society 
 Our question now is: how is an educated man as the 
result of Bildung necessary for interconnecting the two 
principles of Civil Society that is depicted by Hegel in 
paragraph 182 of Elements of the Philosophy of Right?  
 Hegel, in fact, sets up very well the inter-correlation 
between individual efforts as a rational being and the 
necessity of society as the place in which that effort will be 
accomplished. Characterizing an educated man as the 
culmination of Bildung, therefore, must be construed in 
accordance with Hegel’s depiction of Civil Society itself (as I 
have expounded in chapter I).  
 As we know, Hegel depicts Civil Society as that in 
which there is “a system of complete interdependence, 
                                                 
132 Cfr. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, Op. Cit., 14-16. 
 
wherein the livelihood, happiness, and legal status of one 
man is interwoven with the livelihood, happiness, and rights 
of all.”133 In such a society, there must be a kind of 
interdependency of work by which people can satisfy their 
needs in so far as, “Subjective selfishness turns into a contribution 
towards the satisfaction of the needs of everyone else.”134 Bildung now 
manifests itself in the form of an individual process of 
education and skill. Meanwhile, individual education and 
skill in their turn render an individual capable of 
contributing his existence with others in a certain society 
which is depicted as one which essentially is a market 
economy.135  
 The educated man, thanks to the Bildung process, is a 
professional working in the socio - economic web. He can 
understand what there is in people’s minds and so is able to 
satisfy needs. Concretely, the educated man is capable of 
applying in a practical skill what he achieves as a theoretical 
education. Thus, the conduct of the educated man in 
modern society is marked by a socio – economic link. 
                                                 
133 Cfr. P.R., 183 in its translated edition by T.M. Knox. 
134 P.R., 199. 
135 Again, we can say that Bildung is as Hegel’s way of resolving the 
contraposition of the two principles of civil society, on which civil society is 
construed. Just for putting again in mind, those two principles are the 
concrete person as the totality of needs and the mixture of natural 
necessity, and then, that totality of needs is satisfied or accomplished only 
through being mediated by the form of universality, namely, the others in 
civil society. Cfr. P.R., 182. 
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Shortly, in a certain sense, this is a kind of individual 
capability of reading and understanding both conceptually 
and practically what is coming about in people’s orientation 
of an ideal society. 
 We can also develop another point. Since the 
educated man is not merely only part of the social life but 
also exists in the social life as a human rational agent, he is 
also attentive to any change of social orientation in 
accordance with what is in people’s minds. He is even 
sometimes the agent of such social change, since, by Bildung, 
an educated man is capable of reflecting and raising up all 
particularities by “representing them, estimating them, and 
comparing them with one another and then with the means 
they employ, their consequences, etc., and with a sum total 
of satisfaction.”136 
 Hegel also calls the educated man one who stays “at 
a more advanced stage of culture”.137 It is the ability to 
cultivate concepts in such a rational way that produces 
scientific understanding of a certain object. The educated 
man knows how to make every object surrounding him be 
his object of scientific analysis. He succeeds in moving 
beyond a given and immediate reality through the rational 
                                                 
136 P.R., 20. 
137 P.R., 32. 
 
reflective process (that is, Bildung) to make reality itself 
become understood. He doesn’t add anything to his reality, 
but he reflects it to become a part of him, because reality 
itself is rational. 138 Shortly, there is no thought without 
history.139 
 We now know how important Bildung is in the 
context of Civil Society as Hegel describes it. The educated 
man is at the culmination of the process of Bildung; he 
becomes the real human rational agent of society’s self-
movement. There is still something we leave behind as the 
rest of all those explanations of the importance of Bildung 
for overcoming the opposition between the two principles 
of Civil Society.  
                                                 
138 In Hegel’s view, nature is rational within itself. But, he adds that 
the measure of the laws of nature is external to us and, thus, “our cognition 
adds nothing to them and does not advance them: it is only our cognition of 
them which can expand.” Through the act of actual reason, then, the human 
task is only to investigate and grasp conceptually what is in nature. And 
properly because of this, human beings are called to the dignity of freeing 
thought from any particular determination. Accordingly, in his preface of 
Philosophy of Right, Hegel says of the famous statement, “What is rational is 
actual; and what is actual is rational.” See P.R., in addition to Preface pg. 12 
– 13, and pg. 20. 
139 In Hegelian terms, all the contents of any concept have already 
had in themselves the form of existence. Consequently, there is nothing in 
our knowledge based on the emptiness, on nothing. About this, Hegel says, 
“One cannot therefore say that the concept arrives at anything new; on the 
contrary, the last determination coincides in unity with the first.”  Further, 
Hegel also makes a speculative way of thinking content and form as the 
same thing. He says, “The mode of existence of a concept and its 
determinacy are one and the same thing.” See P.R., 32. 
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2.2.2. Civilians as Educated People: Conformity with 
Universality  
 Hegel says, “It is through work of education that the 
subjective will attains objectivity even within itself, that 
objectivity in which alone it is for its part worthy and 
capable of being the actuality of the Idea.”140 In wishing to 
treat the necessity of Bildung to the building of the 
interdependency of every element of Civil Society, I would 
first observe Hegel’s vision of the universe. Secondly, I 
would persist in the discourse of Civil Society as the 
indispensable part for an individual to accomplish his ends.  
 In Hegel’s vision, the world is the objective realm in 
which the Absolute, represented as Spirit, is unfolding or 
manifesting itself. Through Spirit, the Absolute is realizing 
or actualizing itself in the world. Meanwhile, for Spirit the 
world is its objectivity or actuality, which is both identical 
with itself and at the same times opposed to itself, or in a 
word, identity and the otherness (non – identity).141 Only in 
this kind of actuality in the world can the self – movement 
be possible for the Absolute. The world, then, has the 
                                                 
140 P.R., 187. 
141 G.W.F. HEGEL, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by 
A.V. Miller, (Oxford-New York-Toronto-Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 
1977), in Preface, 14. 
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141 G.W.F. HEGEL, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by 
A.V. Miller, (Oxford-New York-Toronto-Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 
1977), in Preface, 14. 
 
purposive activity of the Absolute itself in the plan of 
rationality. Why plan of rationality? 
 Because, according to Hegel, the Spirit can be 
towards its purpose of self – actualization only in the form 
of science.142 It is through science that the individual self-
consciousness can raise every existential – material being in 
the world, and then, man can live for his world belonging to 
his knowledge. But, really, it is in the long process of 
rational and reflective cultivation because, in the world, Idea 
finds itself as the distinction between the concept and 
reality, and hence also between determinacy and 
particularity. The world, then, becomes that in which the 
Idea undergoes a kind of opposition within itself. At the 
same time, Idea is toward the capacity of self-determining 
for itself and in itself. Hegel describes this as the scientific 
development of Idea towards self-sufficiency through 
unfolding and at the same time folding itself.143 The truth is 
found in and by Idea when distinctions are overcome or 
resolved by reconciliation. Those distinctions between 
concept and reality are raised to be the universal form of 
thought. The world in the end becomes the part of his self-
                                                 
142 Hegel says, “The Spirit that, so developed, knows itself as Spirit, 
is Science; Science is its actuality and the realm which it builds for itself in its 
own development.” See, Ibidem. 
143 Cfr. P.R., 32. 
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consciousness. In other words, it becomes his-own. 
According to Hegel, it becomes actually the mediated world 
in which the self – consciousness of every individual is able 
to live with and in science.144 
 It is Bildung as self – education, self – shape, or self – 
cultivation, which takes the part of thinking as individual 
consciousness in the form of universal thought. Since every 
individual is a human rational agent, he should make many 
rational efforts, that is, through and in Bildung, in order to be 
the adequate means of the unfolding Spirit. Through Bildung, 
the human task is to come into objectivity in a way that man 
is able to gain or achieve an advanced stage of culture, in 
which he is the adequate actuality of Spirit itself.145 Bildung, 
                                                 
144 Different from Karl Marx’s view on the necessity of the 
industrial revolution as the major fact of human history in order to 
transform nature, for Hegel, human history must be marked by man itself to 
dominate and transform nature in order that the world itself is to create and 
sustain a universal consciousness in man. It is because, according to Hegel, 
nature, namely the material world, or Aether, is “the ground and the soil of 
Science or knowledge in general.” Meanwhile, according to Hegel, Science 
itself is the actuality of Spirit and the realm which it builds for itself in its 
own element. Cfr. CHARLES TAYLOR, Hegel and Modern Society, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979, 1998), 50 – 51. Also cfr. G.W.F. HEGEL, 
Op. Cit., 14. 
145 In paragraph 187 of Philosophy of Right, Hegel says, “Spirit 
attains its actuality only through internal division, by imposing this limitation 
and finitude upon itself in [the shape of] natural needs and the continuum 
(Zusammenhang) of this external necessity, and in the very process of 
adapting itself to these limitations, by overcoming them and gaining its 
objective existence [Dasein+ within them.” Accordingly, when man achieves 
the advanced stage of culture, thanks to the process of Bildung, he actually 
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 Conclusively, I would cite what Hegel says in this 
context, “This self – consciousness which comprehends 
itself as essence through thought and thereby divests itself 
                                                                                               
actuality, namely, the actuality of the Idea or Spirit. Of Bildung, therefore, 
Hegel says, “This cultivation of the universality of thought is the absolute 
value of education.” And also, “Education is an immanent moment of the 
absolute, and that it has infinite value.” Cfrl. P.R., 20, 187. 
146 Cfr. P.R., 21 
147 Cfr. P.R., 187. 
148 Cfr. P.R., 21 
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of the contingent and the untrue constitutes the principle of 
right, of morality, and of all ethics.”149 So, I have actually 
enlarged upon Hegel’s basic concept of Bildung, through 
which the two principles of Civil Society are linked and 
understandable.  
 
2.2.3. Bildung as a Means of Social Integration 
 Why is it necessary to speak of Bildung when 
speaking of Civil Society? Hegel’s depiction of society is 
actually based on his ontological vision. In order to know 
why Hegel emphasizes Bildung in his conception of Civil 
Society, we must place its necessity in his vision of the 
universe. 
 In the previous section, we discussed Hegel’s 
ontological view of the universe, in which all things are in 
the rational plan. Man’s task is to develop or cultivate 
himself, so far as to take part in that plan in order that the 
universe becomes more and more the adequate place for 
Spirit to actualize itself. We have seen that this task is 
accomplished in Bildung.  
                                                 
149 P.R., 21 
 
 An individual, however, can not do Bildung merely as 
an individual, because as human beings we are always in a 
cultural community. Living in society, therefore, is the 
indispensable part of an individual who wishes to 
accomplish his ends. Thus, we have been discussing the 
conception of society as that, through which and in which, 
an individual links himself with the plan of rationality as the 
necessary plan in order that Spirit might actualize itself in 
the world.  
 Hegel claims this is the difference between modern 
and ancient society. The failure of ancient society to achieve 
social and ethical harmony between people’s ends and that 
of society was marked by the broken-down individuals’ 
identification with their society.150 We saw in the previous 
section how Hegel tries to take over the conceptions of 
ancient Greek society in the way of an individual’s 
identification with Polis in the immediate and natural form, 
                                                 
150 The social case that made the generation of Hegel’s epoch think 
out the political philosophy was French Revolution. It made the thinker of 
freedom redefine it once again, of how to create a world of social 
institutions in which people did feel immediately at home, and experience 
freedom as something already established in their life both privately and 
publicly. Accordingly, Charles Taylor in his Hegel and Modern Society says, 
“Hegel’s account of the breakdown of the Greek city state turns on the 
underlying purpose of realizing a consciousness and way of life which 
universal.” Cfr. CHARLES TAYLOR, Hegel and Modern Society, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), 63 and 100. TERRY PINKARD, Hegel’s 
Phenomenology. The Sociality of Reason, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 187. 
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to his conception of social system which is based on the 
ontological vision of Spirit, in which every individual “can 
give himself to unity with the whole without losing his 
rational freedom”.151 
 In putting forward Bildung, then, Hegel claims a 
depiction of modern society, by which and in which an 
individual will succeed in raising himself from immediacy 
and naturalness, to maturity. He claims also that it is the 
modern society in which there is recognition of individual 
equality and sameness to achieve the ends of every 
individual as a human rational being. He thinks of society 
which considers human being as the base of Ethical Life in 
the realm of rationality. He puts forward that rational realm 
as a social system which drives society toward maturity.152 
Of that social system, we have seen previously that in 
modern society there must be a kind of people’s ends 
conformity with that of society. Of such, Hegel says,  
“In the course of the actual attainment of selfish 
ends – an attainment conditioned in this way by 
universality – there is formed a system of complete 
interdependence, wherein the livelihood, happiness, 
and legal status of one man is interwoven with the 
livelihood, happiness, and rights of all. On this 
system, individual happiness, etc., depend, and only 
                                                 
151 CHARLES TAYLOR, Op.Cit., 139. 
152 Cfr. P.R., in Preface pg. 12. 
 
in this connected system are they actualized and 
secured.”153  
 In putting forward Bildung as an individual’s self – 
education or self – cultivation, there should be a kind of 
renewed Sittlichkeit in the new form, in which man as a 
human rational agent actualizes his freedom in the new 
vision of the world, namely, the world which is based on the 
ontological foundation of Spirit in the necessity of a rational 
plan.154 
 Hence, Hegel is optimistic that his conception of 
Civil Society based on his ontological vision is more 
adequate for realizing integration among the elements of 
civil society than the previous conception. He is also 
optimistic that what society produces is for guaranteeing the 
ends of every individual, meanwhile every individual feels 
secured in living in his society in sharing his possibilities in 
the universal resources of society itself. 
 Now, in modern society, human reason is the agent 
of the social changes in the history of society. Man’s task in 
Bildung is to understand the movement of Spirit which is 
actualizing itself. Hegel actually wants to apply his 
ontological vision to his conception of society. Further, he 
                                                 
153 P.R., 183. 
154 Cfr. TERRY PINKARD, Op.Cit., 295. CHARLES TAYLOR, Op.Cit., 84. 
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153 P.R., 183. 
154 Cfr. TERRY PINKARD, Op.Cit., 295. CHARLES TAYLOR, Op.Cit., 84. 
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calls that application civilization, because civilizing people 
means making them become civilians of Civil Society. We 
are, actually, turning back to what I have expounded in the 
first chapter on social integration in Hegelian Civil Society 
by any dialog between a person in civil society as a totality 
of needs and the necessity of society in order to accomplish 
those needs. The others in society are, on the one hand, 
opponents of his needs, and, on the other hand, an 
indispensable part of his effort to satisfy his needs. It is 
through Bildung that every individual in society can 
contribute to achieve the realization of the world’s purpose, 
i.e. to become rational and based on the rational plan. There 
emerges the optimistic world which creates itself towards its 
maturity. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PROPOSING SOME REFLECTIVE QUESTIONS 
AND TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ON BILDUNG 
AS THE IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF HEGEL’S 
CONCEPT ON CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
 
Introduction 
 Hegel discusses the need for Bildung in the 
interconnection between particularity and universality, in 
paragraph 187 of Elements of the Philosophy of Right. In this 
section, I would like to offer a critical summary of Bildung as 
we have discussed it to this point.  
 
3.1.  The Necessity of Bildung in Hegel’s Depiction 
of Civil Society: A Summary 
 Firstly, Bildung makes an individual capable of 
educating, cultivating, and shaping himself in the global 
vision of society. The educated man as the culmination of 
Bildung knows that the way of life in which he lives is the 
one in a continuing historical way. That way of life is 
formed along with the history of society. In other words, 
Bildung brings an individual into awareness that he is in a 
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certain society the locus of the course of Sittlichkeit in 
history. Bildung, thus, makes an individual capable of not 
remaining in his particular being and time.  
 This also means that in an educated man as the 
culmination of Bildung, what was ethically true and believed 
as morally good in the previous or ancient society, now, 
must be in a relationship with the totality of history itself in 
such a way that there is always something which is renewed 
at present towards maturity.155 At the crucial moment of its 
break-down, Sittlichkeit redefines itself. Sittlichkeit remains 
present in modern society, in its redefinition and renewal 
towards maturity.  
 We have seen how the Greek Polis, as Hegel’s model 
of ancient society, had succeeded in establishing every 
individual’s identification with society. It was the moral 
system of Polis in Sittlichkeit. But, Hegel criticizes that 
identification with society as the one which is based on the 
natural intuition and, consequently, it is very difficult to 
keep an established society which represents the ends of 
every individual in it. There is, nevertheless, something that 
Hegel preserves from the ancient Greek Polis, i.e. the 
                                                 
155 Cfr. KARL LŐWITH, Da Hegel a Nietzsche, La Frattura 
Rivoluzionaria nel Pensiero del Secolo XIX, translated by Giorgio Colli, 
(Torino: Einaudi, 2000), 434. 
 
necessity of society for an individual to achieve his ends 
since it is society with which every individual must link 
himself. Again, the disintegration of the Greek Polis is at the 
same time the gracious moment to redefine the relationship 
between the ends of every individual and that of society. It 
is actually Hegel’s typical solution with regard to the 
problems in the previous conceptions of a relationship 
between an individual as the concrete person with his 
totality of ends and an individual as a citizen.156 
                                                 
156 I refer to the failure of the French Revolution. The French 
Revolution would respond the questions of the participation of people in 
social life; meanwhile the revolutionists had destroyed what was in the 
ancient society. In doing so, they therefore didn’t build anything along with a 
continuing society. But, besides having shown the failure of revolutionists to 
organize a new community, nevertheless, the revolution itself has evoked 
the people’s demands on the equality relied on human mind. In other part, 
by proposing the failure of building an established society in Greek Polis, 
Hegel would propose the continuing society in the form of renewing 
Sittlichkeit before the course of human history itself. By criticizing some 
previous conceptions of the relationship between the individual and society, 
Hegel actually would propose his own vision of the renewing society in the 
plan of rationality itself instead of intuition or natural principles. Hegel 
would put forward the necessity of human reason in order to set out social 
reality according the guidance of rationality plan itself. It takes, then, the 
educating or cultivating individual’s Bildung. It means also that Bildung is 
really the self – formation, self – cultivation, and self – shape, and not 
revolution, correcting what the revolutionary social change of the French 
Revolution had done. Bildung, shortly, is about understanding the historical 
society itself. It is what I mean of Hegel’s typical solution in regard with the 
problems of the relation between the ends of individuals and that of society. 
He synthesizes what there has been in previous conceptions and modifies 
them to become his own vision philosophically. Cfr. KARL LŐWITH, Op.Cit., 
364. CHARLES TAYLOR, Hegel and Modern Society, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979, 1998), 94 – 95.  
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 Secondly, Bildung draws every individual out of his 
particularities and immediacies to come into the higher level 
of knowledge. Hegel actually needs to say this in order to 
preserve his vision of the universe as the objective realm in 
which Spirit is unfolding itself. In other words, the need for 
Bildung in Civil Society is systematic. In order to accomplish 
his ends, the rational human individual must take part of the 
self – manifesting Idea in the form of Bildung in a certain 
social life. Hegel’s conception of Spirit positing itself in the 
world, then, is the guarantee of the necessity of Bildung in 
speaking of civil society. 
 Because the universality in Hegel’s vision is that of 
the history of Spirit unfolding itself in the world in the 
necessary plan of rationality, Bildung makes the world really a 
more and more adequate expression of such a Spirit. And I 
would like to emphasize again that it is in the particular 
human being that Bildung occurs.  
 Thirdly, it follows that in speaking of the necessity 
of Bildung in Civil Society, Hegel has already put man as the 
focus of history itself. It is man as a human rational agent 
who does not merely exist in a certain society, but rather 
who is the social agent which determines society as his own, 
because society itself represents his ends. On this reading, 
Bildung is the civilizational process on the grounds of the 
 
economic interconnection of society, in which an individual 
tries to go beyond his limit into the higher level of education 
and skill. 
 Hence, Ethical Life in modern society (or in Charles 
Taylor’s term, the realized Sittlichkeit157), is the entirety of 
both citizen and society, in which, according to Hegel’s 
ontological vision, both participate in the self – actualizing 
Idea. Only can the educated man (as the result of the 
process of Bildung) know and understand how universality 
comes about in his particularity without losing his radical 
autonomy and freedom. Man is no longer an island, since 
each individual must take part in the larger life of society. At 
the same time, man is the end in itself in society because he 
is actually free and the end in itself. In other words, because 
of man’s nature as a human rational being, there is only man 
in the context of history, society, and progression.158  
                                                 
157 CHARLES TAYLOR, Op.Cit., 84. 
158 Saying of man’s nature as human rational being in history, we 
can say that human mind, indeed, is opened to its historical context. It is of 
mind as human activity and engagement to natural and social world. In 
regard with Hegel’s ontological vision of the world, an educated man in 
Bildung, then, has this opened-mind to social movements which is 
understood as the movement of Idea itself towards its self-determination. 
As a result, an educated man is capable also of passing any re-definition and 
re-interpretation of traditional or antique insights of factual enquiry, when a 
certain tradition, for example, is no longer adequate for a certain rational 
consideration. He knows and understands how to re-define, re-interpret, 
and re-manifest what was believed in the past. In other words, he knows 
about the process of developing what is considered rationally as truth. What 
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 All these come about only because of human mind, 
which must be the adequate mediation for Spirit to actualize 
or manifest itself in the objective world. Because human 
reason itself is deeply social, man as a human rational being 
is also capable of collocating himself as the centre of any 
historical process towards maturity in accordance with the 
plan of rationality itself.159 
 Fourthly, because Hegel depicts civil society as an 
economic movement among producers, consumers, and a 
legal system that guarantees such a movement, Bildung is the 
necessary process of civilization in the form of the exercise 
of human reason. Regarding the economic movement in 
Civil Society, I have talked about theoretical education and 
practical education. The result of Bildung is the individual’s 
general and permanent ability to share his education and 
                                                                                               
was in the past is admitted in the present as that which must be considered 
to be transformed in the higher level rationally. In a certain sense, it is 
admitted too that in the past there was a failure of mind in grasping and 
representing Ethical Life. It is because there was an inadequacy of defining 
and presenting what was believed as truth in the past. By this mediation of 
rational re-interpretation, re-definition, and re-manifestation of what is 
believed as the truth in the past, now, in present, those beliefs are raised up 
and transformed both in a more universal-rational level. It is called as the 
process of a rational embodiment of what was immediate and natural by a 
subject in the form of social and traditional progressive change. Cfr. P.R., 
185. Cfr. also ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 
(Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 357-358. 
159 Cfr. TERRY PINKARD, Hegel’s Phenomenology. The Sociality of 
Reason, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 300. Also, ROBBERT 
PIPPIN, Modernism as a Philosophical Problem, second edition, 
(Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1999) 71. 
 
skill, in order that the economic movement of society can 
come about through increasing its resources.160 Through 
Bildung, every individual in Civil Society, now, is in searching 
and maintaining their possibility of sharing in the universal 
resources. And, further, it means that an educated and 
skilled man has his social role and takes his part in every 
moment of civil society through “his activity, diligence, skill, 
and supports himself in this capacity”.161  
 
3.2. The Question about the Outcasts in Hegel’s 
Civil Society 
 In civil society universality and particularity are 
“bound up with and conditioned by each other although 
they have become separated”.162  
                                                 
160 Cfr. P.R., 199. 
161 P.R., 207. 
162 P.R., 184. We have seen that in a concrete social life, the 
relation between particularity and universality is a kind of how to harmonize 
the private and public sphere, from which at the same time there emerge 
many problems. It bears also the distinction of what is and what ought. Civil 
society, then, is the sphere of the distance between particularity and 
universality that should be mediated. We have seen those problems and 
solutions in regard with Hegel’s ontological vision of the world, that is, the 
self – unfolding Spirit in the objective world. Cfr. JEAN L. COHEN and 
ANDREW ARATO, Civil Society and Political Theory, (Cambridge, London: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992, 1999), 95 – 96.  
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 Speaking of social integration in society, Hegel in a 
certain sense conceives Civil Society as a general and 
universal family, in which every member of society becomes 
the son of his society.163 We have seen that this general and 
universal family is marked by the system of needs, protected 
by the system of law, and controlled by means of the 
general authority. Something which is expected by people 
from society in such a social system, then, is that the more 
general resources are augmented the more possible it 
becomes for their ends to be satisfied.  
 In this plan of social integration towards a general 
and universal family which is based on an economical 
system, the question I would put forward is about the 
outcasts. Hegel says that there must be no outcasts in his 
depiction of society because it is society which is the part of 
the self – manifesting Idea, in which thinking rationally is 
the guarantee of the equality of every individual.164 In this 
case, he would answer the question of outcasts proposing 
the acquisition of rationality through individual efforts in 
order that society is more and more the adequate emanation 
of Spirit manifesting itself in an objective world. This is, 
shortly, Hegel’s solution for every possible social problem.  
                                                 
163 Cfr. P.R., 238 – 239. 
164 Cfr. P.R., 209. 
 
 Since building a society based on an economic 
movement with the requirement of general and universal 
resources generates social conflicts, we can ask whether 
Hegel’s solution in his ontological vision is capable of 
addressing the social problems of the contemporary society, 
i.e. the problem of outcasts. Is his solution of proposing 
Bildung adequate in facing social problems of contemporary 
society? 
 In the following section, I would attempt to observe 
the contemporary social problems of outcasts which Hegel 
might leave us today. 
 
3.2.1 The Questions of Immigration 
 The question of the contemporary society that I 
would propose in regard to Hegel’s plan of building an 
integral society is that of immigration. Why immigration? 
Because the social phenomenon of immigration itself is 
usually motivated by economics,165 while Hegel underlies his 
                                                 
165 Hegel admits too that the population in a certain society will 
grow to a certain point in which there is not enough resource to provide 
citizens. It is properly about extending economy resources to a higher 
possibility of providing the ends of its citizens. It is also the tendency of 
every society to establish itself in order to become a steady society 
economically. It opens, then, the possibility of a mixture of the multi – 
national people in the form of colonization. Cfr. P.R., 247 – 248. 
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depiction of Civil Society on the reciprocal economical 
needs, which are concerned immediately with economic 
affairs, Hegel’s social conception is still relevant today.  
 The social question of immigration is concerned 
with the phenomenon of an industrial society, which evokes 
people from a lower socio – economic level in one society 
to come to look for a better wage in another society. As a 
result, there will be among other things the jump in growth 
of the population, for example, in a certain industrial 
society. There may come at a certain point where society 
can no longer provide an institutional education for 
civilization. The question of immigration is a contemporary 
problem that casts doubt on Hegel’s solution of self-
sufficiency for civilization.166  
 The first question which the problem of 
immigration gives us from the social phenomenon of 
immigration is that of social change. Multi-national 
                                                 
166 We have known that Hegel proposes the concept of self-
sufficiency as the plan of civilization, namely, Bildung. In proposing self-
sufficiency, Hegel considers an integration of civil society in a certain level, at 
which civil society becomes similar to the integral family. Self-sufficiency 
then becomes a social bond of civil society, by which everyone now becomes 
a son of civil society; that is similar to love as the natural and immediate 
bond of family. But, now, facing the problem of multi-national immigration, 
what Hegel hopes of an integral civil society which is based on the 
equilibrated of the two principles of particularity and universality is very 
difficult to apply. Cfr. P.R., 158, 238.218-219. Cfr. also JEAN L. COHEN and 
ANDREW ARATO, Op.Cit.,106. 
 
immigration has changed the social structure. An industrial 
– modern society, for example, faces every social change 
that possibly derives from a multi-national immigration and 
the globalization of the economic market. The possible 
social change which derives from the social phenomenon of 
an industrial society in the modern world has occasioned a 
kind of redefinition or re-interpretation of Hegel’s guarantee 
to establish civil society, namely, Spirit which is self – 
manifesting or self – unfolding in the objective world. 
Accordingly, we have seen this tendency of social change in 
the form of the break-up of Sittlichkeit, where there is no 
longer an identification of an individual with his society. 
Consequently, the industrial – modern society is facing a 
threat of social change at any moment.167 
 The second question is that of public power. In 
facing the jumping growth of population, public power 
should keep or maintain social stability and integrity. It is 
about the question of establishing or maintaining a steady 
society at a certain economic level, while at the same time, 
society itself faces the questions that attend a multi-cultural 
population. Can a multi-cultural population become a 
people?  
                                                 
167 Cfr. CHARLES TAYLOR, Op.Cit., 125. 
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 In order to establish or maintain the social 
integration of civil society in the context of the multicultural 
society, the general authority might, for example, pass an 
oppressive law in the name of civil education. The 
administration of justice in the form of a positive law is at 
risk of being the opponent of the ends of a multi-cultural 
people, or vice versa. Public security is challenged by the 
ends of massive numbers of people. We, in fact, are back to 
the discourse of social change as the moment of redefining 
Sittlichkeit.  
 In those cases above, the new generation in the 
aftermath of immigration could quite plausibly be excluded 
from the process of civilization. In the aftermath of 
immigration, there will be born a new generation that is 
removed from its parent’s Sittlichkeit, while they are still 
regarded as foreigners in a certain industrial – modern 
society. As long as this new generation in the aftermath of 
immigration can be an outcast in an industrial society, so 
long does the question of Bildung remain posed in the face 
of the cultural integration in the case of social integration. 
When being applied to the reality of contemporary society, 
Bildung towards an individual self-sufficiency as a means of 
the social integration as the link of a market economy, as 
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Hegel proposes it, should be understood by an individual 
before the social question of the multiform of cultures.   
 Treatment of Bildung in the context of social 
integration in a multi-cultural society will eventually involve 
critical reflection on Hegel’s starting point, that is, man’s 
realization as a human rational being in raising up his 
particularity, separating himself from nature and immediacy 
and overcoming them according to the order of 
rationality.168 Precisely, realizing itself in order to be 
recognized by others in society is really a human task as a 
citizen, because society is the objective field of what is 
particular and subjective through recognition, legality or 
illegality, and being known by others.169 This full realization 
in the modern – industrial society occasions enormous 
social problems. In this case, Bildung means also civilization, 
that is, what Hegel calls people’s participation in social life, 
in order that every moment of civil society, therefore, 
becomes that of civilizing people. 
 In the case of social change that results from 
immigration, Bildung is still relevant today. In Bildung, an 
individual educates or exercises himself rationally in order to 
                                                 
168 Cfr. AVINERI, SHLOMO, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 88 – 89. 
169 Cfr. P.R., 132. 
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be capable of getting true knowledge and adaptation with 
every new social circumstance. Through Bildung, an 
individual separates himself from his particularities, but at 
the same time he finds himself in his appropriation of 
subjectivity by raising up those particularities.170 It means he 
becomes mature when facing every social change he finds in 
his society.  
 In this rational, reflective, and social capacity of 
individual reason, conclusively, there is no longer the 
outcast in society.171  
 
3.2.2. The Question of Poverty 
 The modern society that Hegel wants to depict is 
economically productive, as it has the full participation of 
every member in it to increase the accumulation of the 
general resources. Hegel proposes that the civilizing process 
through increasing or augmenting an individual’s possibility 
of sharing his education and skills in order that the universal 
and general resource is increased too. 
                                                 
170 Cfr. SHLOMO AVINERI, Op.Cit., 90. P.R., 187. 
171 Cfr. P.R., 209. 
 
 On the one hand, it is the conception of society 
which measures society economically. On the other, the 
individual’s good is found in his ability to apply his 
education and skills to the general and universal resources. 
This is the reciprocal relationship between particularity and 
universality, in which society obtains its integral 
community.172 It is, thus, economically Hegel’s view of the 
development of modern society.173 
 Human work is personal and at the same time 
essential for human life, specifically for his living in 
society.174 Having property, therefore, is important as the 
result of human work. Property itself is rational because 
human work itself is done by man as a human rational 
                                                 
172 Actually, it is the relevancy of the vocabulary of Sittlichkeit, in 
which there is a certain individual’s identification with society, since society 
itself has represented individual ends. Or, in other words, individual ends 
and that of society are linked with. It is, actually, Hegelian concept in a 
temporary view of modern society. Cfr. CHARLES TAYLOR, Op.Cit., 129 – 130. 
173 In order to maintain or keep its establishment, civil society 
must do an economical effort to an accumulation wealth, or universal and 
general resources. Cfr. P.R., 199, 243. 
174 Hegel’s view of human work as the essential thing in human 
social life, actually, reflects what came about in the culture of society in 19th 
century. Human work is concerned immediately with his nature of rational 
being. The work therefore is human rational achievement to appropriate 
nature to him. Working becomes the means of human rational being to get 
his appropriation with nature, in which an individual is externalized himself 
and, as a result, he confirms his essence in his objective existence in the 
world. Hegel, thus, sees human rational working as man’s formation in the 
world, separating himself, and turning back to himself in a higher stage, that 
is, reconciling with nature. Cfr. SHLOMO AVINERI, Op.Cit., 90 – 91. KARL 
LŐWITH, Op.Cit., 391, 396 – 397. 
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being.175 It means, therefore, that to lack property is to lack 
the result of man’s capacity as a rational being to 
appropriate nature to himself.  
 Poverty is consequently the other side of Hegel’s 
conception of the developing society which is based on the 
economic system of needs. Poverty is the degradation of 
society in its process of civilization.176 Hegel also has 
assumed poverty as a subjective disposition of the lazy, 
vicious, barbarian, clumsy man.177  
 Hegel divides social class in accordance with his 
speculative philosophical theory of concept178; they are the 
substantial or immediate class (agricultural class), the 
reflecting or formal class (business class), and universal class 
(the class of civil servants).179 Meanwhile, Hegel claims to 
undergird his conception of civil society on the 
interdependency of the social – economic welfare in the 
system of needs and work. He does not include the working 
                                                 
175 Cfr. P.R., 196, 218. SHLOMO AVINERI, Op.Cit., 88, 148 – 149.  
176 Cfr. P.R., 241. 
177 Cfr. P.R., 241, and addition to paragraph 197. 
178 Cfr. P.R., 21. In this paragraph, Hegel confirms his ontological 
vision of universe as self – manifesting Spirit through human mind. By this 
speculative ontological vision, he wants to underlie all his philosophical 
explanation including his social class division of civil society. He says that, in 
his speculative theory, the principle of right, morality, and ethics, is 
constituted and understood only in the course of the history of Concept. It is 
Concept which comprehends itself as essence through thought and divests 
itself of the untrue and contingency.  
179 Cfr. P.R., 202 – 204. 
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or labourer class in his depiction of civil society. Meanwhile, 
Hegel emphasizes the reciprocal satisfaction of needs 
through the social interdependence of each on all in 
interconnecting work180, he makes the working class or 
labourers to be outcasts from the process of civilization.  
 Strictly speaking, the process of civilization with its 
emphasis on the individual self – sufficiency in the linked 
economic system, does not belong to the working class. In 
connection with the question of immigration which I have 
mentioned in a previous section, then, this is a serious 
omission of Hegel’s class division.181 If the working class in 
modern – industrial society is not included as part of the 
existent social class, while their work has increased the 
general income, the labourer will be the real outcast of Civil 
Society. Consequently, there will be a serious threat of 
poverty.  
 The problem of poverty, therefore, remains open to 
us. The difficulty in applying Hegel’s conception of Bildung 
to the recent industrial-social problems of poverty is found 
in the social fact that in a modern – industrial society, there 
are many poor people who have no fixed family. There are 
street boys, homeless, and nomads. Industrial society has 
                                                 
180 Cfr. P.R., 199. 
181 Cfr. JEAN L. COHEN and ANDREW ARATO, Op.Cit., 98 – 99. 
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caused the traffic of men who come from varied social and 
cultural origins, as I have mentioned in the previous section 
of immigration. It is actually the reality of cosmopolitan 
society which bears the lack of the Hegelian concept of a 
unified family as the ground of Bildung itself, without which 
there is no primary self-education in spiritual and particular 
form.182  
 
3.3. Tentative Conclusion  
3.3.1. Bildung as the Means of the Individual and 
Social Integration in History 
 Talking about the necessity of Bildung in Hegel’s 
depiction of Civil Society, it is important to know how it is 
conceptually connected with Hegel’s ontological vision of 
the universe. The universe, or precisely the totality of the 
universe, is the larger life in which every individual exists, 
lives, and self – actualizes. The guarantee of this vision is the 
life of Spirit itself. Spirit is self – actualizing or self – 
expressing in the objective world in order to both oppose or 
                                                 
182 This lack of individual’s ground of the proper existence in a 
unified family also means that there is not a kind of building individual’s 
consciousness regards with the primary, divine, and obligating factor. It 
means as well that Hegel’s starting point of universal interdependence in 
civil society is deprived of individual’s self-sufficiency in its basic sense of 
family. Cfr. P.R., 181. 
 
separate with itself and at the same time appropriate itself. It 
is Spirit’s process of self – dialog in the objective world 
towards a higher and higher stage of maturity. Because of 
this vision, the totality of the universe is not the status quo, 
rather it grows up towards its maturity. This process comes 
about in the plan of rationality. This plan makes the world 
become more and more scientific according to the rational 
order.  
 That plan of rationality actually takes place in man 
because man is a rational being. It is Bildung in which man 
exercises his reason to develop objective reality in the order 
of a scientific plan of rationality. Bildung, therefore, is a 
human rational being in history. History is the development 
of the scientific Idea in which man as a human rational 
being has an indispensable role through Bildung.  
 History of concrete societies is that of Sittlichkeit 
itself by means of redefinition and reinterpretation. It is, 
thus, the human mind’s role, through Bildung, in history. 
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182 This lack of individual’s ground of the proper existence in a 
unified family also means that there is not a kind of building individual’s 
consciousness regards with the primary, divine, and obligating factor. It 
means as well that Hegel’s starting point of universal interdependence in 
civil society is deprived of individual’s self-sufficiency in its basic sense of 
family. Cfr. P.R., 181. 
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exercises his reason to develop objective reality in the order 
of a scientific plan of rationality. Bildung, therefore, is a 
human rational being in history. History is the development 
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3.3.2. Bildung as Human Reason’s Capability of 
Communication 
 The three terms of history are purpose, standard, 
and progression. The world’s history has a certain purpose. 
In order to obtain that purpose, it needs an adequate 
standard. As long as a standard is adequate, a certain epoch 
of history can obtain its purpose, and so much more 
progressive will a certain society be. All this happens 
through Bildung.  
 Human reason can be valid and recognized 
objectively by others in a relationship to a certain social 
system. Human reason is not closed in itself without any 
surrounding context. Reason is in relation and 
communication with an interconnected social system. This 
social and communicational dimension of human reason is 
only possible because it has the capability of cultivating, 
reflecting, and transforming whatever is immediate and 
natural to become an understandable form.  
 This communicational dimension of human reason 
is really the power of man in history to build a rational 
society. This communicational – rational capacity of human 
reason must be the guarantee of man’s dignity in history 
without being restricted by racialism, primordial-exclusive 
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spirit among tribes, or the colour of skin. It is man as the 
proper subject who makes history, since every individual as 
a human rational being has authority in himself according to 
his power of reason. This human reason’s capability is 
individual and at the same time social. 
 Human reason’s capability of communicating itself 
to the others must be able to resolve the conflict of 
traditions in a multicultural society as I have proposed in 
previous sections as the social problem of the modern – 
industrial society.  
 
3.3.3. Living in Society as a kind of Classroom of 
Bildung 
 In order to achieve his ends, an individual needs 
others both in social form and in freedom. We have seen 
that this needs Bildung. In the individual’s hard process of 
Bildung, therefore, individual, society, and freedom are the 
indispensable demands. These three important elements 
above can only exist together in accordance with the order 
of rationality itself. Meanwhile, the plan of rationality in a 
modern – industrial world is no longer found in the sense of 
the Hegelian cosmic Spirit, but in the order of rationality 
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itself in an existent society. Shortly, such an order can be 
found only in historically existent social life.  
 Living in Civil Society, then, becomes a kind of 
classroom in which each must learn how to live in the spirit 
of togetherness under the guidance of authoritative reason. 
It lays out a series of historically human experiences that 
man cultivates his rational and conceptual acquisition of 
every worldly object.183 Man’s history in society becomes 
that of gaining self-consciousness through the interaction of 
subject – object including social and communicational 
relationships.  
 Living in society is also the classroom to learn to 
achieve every possible equilibration between maintaining a 
required and established social system and keeping attentive 
to the people’s spirit. Trying to keep such an equilibration 
means continuing Bildung in society. In other words, in 
society, both social and individual reality should become 
more and more an adequate necessary process of human life 
to be scientific and rational.  
 Finally, while Hegel’s ontological foundation of the 
self – actualizing Spirit as the cosmic world soul becomes 
difficult to understand in modern – industrial society, 
                                                 
183 Cfr. SHLOMO AVINERI, Op.Cit., 132. 
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to be scientific and rational.  
 Finally, while Hegel’s ontological foundation of the 
self – actualizing Spirit as the cosmic world soul becomes 
difficult to understand in modern – industrial society, 
                                                 
183 Cfr. SHLOMO AVINERI, Op.Cit., 132. 
 
Hegel’s proposal of Bildung is still relevant in today’s life, in 
order that life itself becomes something to learn, self – 
educate, self – cultivate, and self – form. And to pass such a 
Bildung, living with others in close communication is 
indispensable, in order that life may proceed progressively in 
accordance with the order of the human – reflective – 
rational being itself.  
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